Perhaps one of the most controversial episodes in the later half of the twentieth century is what is known as the “Iran-Contra Affair.” This political scandal, which erupted in 1985 and 1986, evolved from an elaborate plan by high-ranking members of President Ronald Reagan’s administration to arrange secret sales of arms to the terrorist nation of Iran. The scandal would unfold to reveal a secret plot to fund contras against a leftist, Sandinista controlled Nicaragua. The investigations that would attempt to piece together the events of this affair would blemish Ronald Reagan, as well as the presidency. The web of lies, cover-ups, and silence by several members of the White House administration make the story complex and difficult to decipher. There is still much that the American public does not know about the Iran-Contra Scandal, however, there is much information on the subject that has become available since President Reagan’s final term in office. In uncovering the facts on this issue we will examine important events and decisions, explaining how each effected the role of the President of the United States.
Arms Sales to Iran
In 1980 the American people saw an incumbent, Democrat President Jimmy Carter pitted against an aged, Republican Governor from California named Ronald Reagan. Carter had spent his presidency trying to sustain the scrutiny he received over his failing economic policy. Ronald Reagan, known as “The Great Communicator,” began to gain support within the electorate through his captivating speeches and strong pro-American sentiment. Reagan won an electoral landslide that year, sealing his place as the fortieth President of the United States of America. Although Carter had been seen as lacking in certain areas of his presidency, many political scientists agree that his weak foreign policy was perhaps the core of his inevitable downfall in the 1980 election. Many people believe Carter lost the election by such a large margin because of his inability to negotiate the release of fifty-two American hostages who were seized at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran on 4 November 1979 (Sick 3).
The hostages were released, but well after Election Day had come and gone. The Reagan-Bush camp has been suspect in collaborating with a third-party group to organize the release of the hostages during the campaign process. The intent was to directly effect the outcome of the election (Sick 13). Not only did this event signal the downfall of Jimmy Carter’s political career, but it also served to foreshadow how the future administration was going to run the presidency. The issue of hostages would soon resurface, and plans were quickly underway to resolve the problem during the beginning of Reagan’s first term in the White House.
The Iran Issue
Yet another American hostage situation came to President Reagan’s attention during the latter part of his first term in office. The nation of Lebanon was holding U.S. hostages without much possibility of releasing them. National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane, the council’s head, first approached Reagan with a plan for the United States to facilitate Israel to supply missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of the American hostages in Lebanon (Strober & Strober 447). This idea went against President Reagan’s highly publicized policy known as “Operation Staunch,” an international plan to ban nations from selling arms to Iran (Pemberton 172). In fact, upon first hearing this idea, Reagan was adamantly against the plan. However, after persistent meetings with his advisors, Reagan began to construct a new stance that was contrary to his policy of not doing business with terrorist nations. As Reagan later explained his reasoning for this policy change:
“It’s the same thing as if one of my children was kidnapped and there was a demand for ransom. Sure, I don’t believe in ransom, because it leads to more kidnapping. But if I find out that there’s somebody who has access to the kidnapper and can get my child back without doing anything for the kidnapper, I’d sure do that (Reagan 512).”
The President and his National Security Advisors soon began to form an arrangement with Iran to obtain the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, a chief aide to the National Security Council, was chosen to be in charge of this covert U.S. initiative. From the late summer of 1985 to mid-autumn of 1986 the Reagan administration sold arms to Iran, who was currently in a bloody war with Iraq (Cannon 521). Of the arms supplied to Iran were two thousand and four TOW antitank missiles and more than two hundred spare parts for HAWK surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles (Cannon 524). The intent of this was to persuade Iran to use its influence to arrange the release of the hostages in Lebanon. Indeed, this tactic worked, facilitating the release of three American hostages. This was fruitless however, as those three were quickly replaced by the kidnapping of three other Americans. President Reagan gained scrutiny as he did not disclose his initiatives in Iran to Congress until after the release of the hostages. This was not the event that put Reagan in the “hot seat” of American politics, however. That event would surface soon after.
The Contra Issue
The idea of contras had been debated early in President Reagan’s first term in office. In July 1979, Nicaraguan dictator Anastsio Somoza fell from power. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, leader of an extreme leftist group in Nicaragua, soon began to consolidate Somoza’s old position under a Sandinista government. Saavedra began to establish relations with Moscow and allowed weapons to flow from Nicaragua to rebels in El Salvador (Pemberton 174). Many members of Reagan’s administration saw Saavedra’s tactics as a major threat to the United States. The President saw this as an opportunity to squelch the Sandinistas by denouncing the government as a communist threat. In later years, Reagan appeared to have strong feelings toward aiding contras (military rebel groups) against the Sandinistas when on 1 March 1985 he said they were the “moral of our Founding Fathers.” Later that year, the President claimed that members of Congress who opposed supporting the contras “really are voting to have a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist government here in the Americas” (Pemberton 173). Then, on 16 March 1981, Reagan signed NSDD-17, which authorized nearly twenty million dollars to build the contras into a fighting force. On 1 December of that same year, Reagan decided to sign a finding to cover the secret operations. This was the beginning of a covert war that killed thousands of people and cost several million dollars (Pemberton 175).
As early as 1982, however, the press began to uncover the contras in Central America. Pressure was increasingly placed on Congress and the President to stop providing military assistance to the contras. From this controversy came the Boland Amendment, which, under much political pressure, President Reagan signed on 21 December 1982. The Boland Amendment prohibited the Department of Defense and the CIA to finance any effort to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The public awareness of the contras in Nicaragua did not stop the National Security Council, however. In fact, the NSC staff intensified their covert operations in Central America at the close of 1982.
1984 brought about several important issues. By this time the NSC had taken complete control of the contras from the CIA. When Oliver North stated that contra funding would run out by June, twenty-one million dollars was requested by the administration for supplemental support. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill refused the request, and Reagan directed the NSC staff to hold the contras together “body and soul” (Strober & Strober 447). Reagan then began to look for financial support from other countries. Herein lies the major scandal.
Most Americans did not see the situations with Iran and Nicaragua as related in any way. Both events happened around the world from each other, and there were no apparent ties binding them together. In fact, the only two similarities the two had in common were that they happened around the same time. What the American public did not know is that the funding of the contras in Central America was due in part to the sale of arms to Iran. On 25 November 1986 President Ronald Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese disclosed to the nation that the two were indeed interrelated. The President began his press conference by stating emphatically that he had not been “fully informed” of the activities that occurred in connection with the Iran initiative (Kornbluh & Byrne xv). Further reports went on to detail that Iran was overcharged for the weapons they received from the United States, and some of the proceeds from the sales were diverted to rebel forces in Nicaragua–the contras–despite specific congressional restrictions on such actions (Cannon 521). Despite Reagan’s denial in knowing of these actions, the implications of arms sales to Iran in conjunction with funding contras in Nicaragua was wide-ranging across Washington, and the United States as a whole.
Ramifications of the Iran-Contra Affair
Still denying his full knowledge of the NSC’s involvement with the contras, President Reagan appointed several members to the Tower Commission on 1 December 1986. The Tower Commission, made up of John Tower, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scrowcroft, set out for a “comprehensive review” of the NSC’s operational role in the Iran-Contra Affair (Kornluh & Byrne xx). The Commission interviewed several participants in the scandal, including Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Oliver North, Admiral Poindexter, and Robert McFarlane. After the extensive interviewing of Reagan’s administration, the Tower Commission issued its final report on 26 February 1987. The Commission found that the NSC staff had acted on their own initiative without the approval or full knowledge of the President. This report advanced a “rogue squad” theory of the NSC staff and exonerated President Reagan. The Tower Commission attributed this to Reagan’s “hands-off management style” (Kornbluh & Byrne xx).
Two select congressional committees investigated the Iran-Contra Affair as well, releasing a much more powerful blow to Ronald Reagan and his administration. These select committees consisted of the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition. After forty days of joint public hearings, more than three hundred thousand reviews of documents, and more than five hundred witness testimonies studied, the two committees released their final reports on 13 November 1987 (Cannon 523). These reports would haunt the Reagan administration for the rest of his presidency. As the six hundred and ninety page report stated:
“[T]he ultimate responsibility for the events in the Iran-Contra Affair must rest with the President…It was the President’s policy–not an isolated decision by North or Poindexter–to sell arms secretly to Iran and to maintain the Contras ‘body and soul'” (Kornbluh & Byrne xx).”
Unlike the Tower Commission’s report, the findings of the select congressional committees held many people, including President Reagan, responsible for the scandal with Iran and the contras. The commissions’ findings led to several court cases that were directly aimed at the NSC staff.
Independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh would take control of the court cases against NSC officials, most notably John Poindexter and Oliver North. Poindexter, throughout the entirety of the investigations, claimed that he withheld knowledge of the diversion of funds from President Reagan saying, “the buck stops with me” (Cannon 522). Admiral Poindexter was not a very credible person, and was proven on several occasions to have blatantly lied to the congressional committees. John Poindexter did not testify at his own trial which ended with his conviction on five felony accounts including conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, and lying to Congress. This sentence was later overturned by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia after the court found that several witnesses had been tainted by Poindexter’s immunized testimony before Congress in 1987 (Cannon 522).
Oliver North was convicted on three felony accounts of destroying documents, obstruction of Congress, and accepting an illegal gratuity. The destroying documents conviction was later overturned after an appellate court found that the judge did not properly detail his instructions to the jury. The two other convictions were set aside until the prosecutors dropped the case. As with Admiral Poindexter, the prosecution decided they could not prove that witnesses had not been influenced by North’s testimony before Congress (Cannon 522).
Because neither Poindexter nor North admitted that the President had full knowledge of their actions, Ronald Regan was never indicted. Lawrence Walsh felt strongly, however, that the President was directly linked to the scandal. Walsh repeated the sentiment of the congressional hearings by concluding:
“President Reagan created the conditions which made possible the crimes committed by others by his secret deviations from announced national policy as to Iran and hostages and by his open determination to keep the contras together ‘body and soul’ despite a statutory ban on contra aid (Pemberton 173).”
Reasons for How the Affair Was Handled by the White House
So why did the NSC staff and perhaps even perhaps the President himself directly violate Congress and continue to aid the contras? Why, also, did the Reagan administration feel they could violate the Boland Amendment and divert funds from the sale of arms to Iran to aid in Nicaraguan contras? There are many theories to explain the administration’s actions, however few have the validity of William Pemberton’s view in his book Exit With Honor–The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan. In his detailed account of the Iran-Contra Affair, Pemberton suggests that the Reagan administration was highly frustrated at the restraints placed on the presidency after the Vietnam War, and felt they had supreme authority in foreign affairs. Pemberton also asserts that the White House wanted to counter Soviet and Cuban influence in Central America, and they felt it was their duty to do so (Pemberton, 173).
Other historians have furthered this argument by claiming that Reagan ran an “imperial presidency” in which he engaged in military adventurism. As mentioned by Pemberton, the Vietnam War led to several restrictions by Congress on the presidency. One such restriction was the War Powers Act of 1973, which stated that such unauthorized military actions were not within the President’s power. Another restriction placed on the presidency was the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment which required the President to demonstrate to Congress that covert operations of any sort were necessary, and also to release this information to Congress in a timely fashion. Reagan’s NSC staff felt that the President had reigning authority over foreign affairs, and any legal hindrance to his actions should be loosely interpreted. Therefore, Reagan’s administration felt they were doing their patriotic duty in order to protect the power of the presidency. Many historians credit this idea of strong patriotism to why staff such as John Poindexter emphatically denied the President’s role in the diversion of funds to the contras. It was their duty as Americans (Pemberton 173).
Conclusions
One question that still remains with us today is whether or not Ronald Reagan knew of more details of the Iran-Contra Affair then he has claimed over the years. Many people feel that he had to have known what was occurring among his own NSC staff, and that Poindexter and North were merely “covering” for the President in a sense of loyalty and duty. In fact, Lawrence Walsh’s final report of his investigation in January of 1994 concluded that there was no evidence that Reagan had broken the law, but he noted that Reagan may have participated in, or known about, a cover-up. Certainly, President George Bush’s 1992 pardons of several government officials involved or convicted in the scandal would seem to concrete this idea. Whether or not Ronald Reagan knew the full extent of the Iran-Contra Affair, the fact is that his administration was one that viewed the presidency as the elite power in the U.S. government. This view of the presidency has caused many debates among political analysts. Former President Abraham Lincoln once posed the question, “Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?” Perhaps Ronald Reagan and his NSC staff were wrong in not informing Congress of their actions with Iran and the Nicaraguan contras. Or maybe their actions were necessary in securing the democracy and the safety of the United States. This debate is one that will effect the role of Presidents for years to come.
Works Cited
Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Public Affairs, 1991.
Kornbluh, Peter, and Malcolm Byrne. Introduction. The Iran-Contra Scandal: The The Unclassified History. By same. New York: New York Press, 1993. xv-xxii.
Pemberton, William E. Exit With Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan. Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1997.
Reagan, Ronald. An American Life. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.
Sick, Gary. October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. New York: Random House, 1991.
Strober, Deborah Hart, and Gerald S. Strober. Reagan, The Man and His Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
