On the evening of March 31, 1968, just as many American families had finished washing their dishes in the kitchen; President Lyndon Baines Johnson appeared on their television screens in the living room. He wanted to talk to them about “peace in Vietnam.”
This was an unusual way for him to begin his address.
During the late ’60’s the words “peace” and “Vietnam” rarely came out of the president’s mouth in the same sentence. He was more likely to utter “the war in Vietnam”. But on this night he was opening the door to change, and he was opening it wide.
In this now legendary speech, Lyndon Baines Johnson declared that the United States would immediately stop dropping bombs on North Viet Nam. Then he dropped a verbal bomb on his fellow citizens by announcing, “I will not seek, and I will not accept the nomination of my party for another term as your president.”
To those sitting in front of the T.V. it seemed that Johnson had had enough and was throwing in the towel after taking a beating. Who could blame them? LBJ was presiding over a United States suffering through some very hard times.
Just the summer before he made his surprise announcement, major riots had gutted the inner cities of Newark and Detroit. Johnson had had to send paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division with tanks and machine guns to help Governor George Romney’s Michigan National Guard quell the Detroit disturbances. Johnson’s popularity nose-dived as white disenchantment with his civil rights programs grew into a political backlash. It looked like LBJ was losing control of both his party and the streets of America’s major cities.
The situation in Vietnam was not much better. The American public had been watching U.S. casualties mount there since July 1965. By late 1967 the war had grown costly in terms of both money and lives and had begun to divide the nation.
President Johnson had been compelled to ask Congress for tax increases to continue both the war and his social programs. To rally public support he and General Westmoreland had promised that victory was in sight – that the enemy was nearly beaten. The phrase “light at the end of the tunnel” had become popular in the closing months of 1967.
Then came the Tet offensive at the end of January 1968, and suddenly that light at the end of the tunnel disappeared under and avalanche of shot and shell. Everyone watching the evening news could see that the enemy remained much stronger than LBJ or General Westmoreland had led them to believe. After the Tet offensive Viet Nam overshadowed LBJ’s presidency more than ever. As casualties mounted and the prospects of victory seemed to diminish, Johnson’s popularity sank even further. Peace protestors burned their draft cards and chided Johnson as a murderer and a war criminal. The crowds would chant “Hey, Hey LBJ! How many kids have you killed today?”
Out of the growing anti-war sentiment Senator Eugene McCarthy had emerged as a peace candidate in November 1967 saying, “I am concerned that the Administration seems to have set no limit to the price it is willing to pay for a military victory.” Initially, political pundits dismissed him as a minor nuisance with little chance of threatening Johnson in the primaries.
But the Tet offensive thrust McCarthy into prominence and he began to appeal to those Democrats who had tired of the war. He managed to shock Johnson in the New Hampshire primary on March 12, 1968. He scored 42% of the popular vote against Johnson’s 49%.
McCarthy’s strong showing in New Hampshire encouraged Senator Robert Kennedy to announce on March 16 that he was seeking the Democratic nomination for president.
It certainly looked like the wolves were at LBJ’s door by the time he announced he was quitting the race. Publicly it looked like he was bowing out before he got kicked out.
But Johnson’s chief of staff, W. Marvin Watson says that there is more to the story than meets the eye. In his book Chief of Staff: Lyndon Johnson and His Presidency Watson states that LBJ was thinking about leaving office as early as 1965.
The gall bladder operation the President underwent in October 1965 took quite a toll on him. He did not heal as quickly as his doctors had anticipated and his recuperation was long and painful. Heavily influenced by the constant pain he had Justice Abe Fortas (who had been LBJ’s lawyer prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court) draft up a letter of resignation, but by the time Johnson received the draft his pain had subsided. He decided to stay on.
In regards to the 1968 election, Johnson vacillated. On one hand he was proud of his administration’s accomplishments in civil rights and the war on poverty. He wanted to effect even more progress in these areas, and he wanted to bring the war in Vietnam to a successful conclusion.
On the other hand LBJ was deeply concerned about his health. He worried about suffering a massive heart attack (like the one he had in 1955) or a stroke that might leave him incapacitated while still in office. Men in his family had a history of dying young – usually in their fifties. At the end of 1967 Johnson was 59 years old and pushing past the family life expectancy envelope.
Watson says that Johnson’s staff began preparations for a campaign despite the President’s indecision on this matter. They began the necessary fund raising. A Johnson election organization was quietly emplaced, political alliances were formed, and polling began. Nevertheless, Johnson refused to actively campaign and even instructed Watson to prepare a statement withdrawing LBJ’s candidacy.
Johnson informed his chief of staff that he would include his withdrawal as part of his State of the Union address scheduled for January 17, 1968. On page 269 of his book Watson describes how LBJ stood in his bedroom getting ready to leave for the Capitol where he was to deliver his speech:
“The President had the text of the main speech in his hand, and on the table beside the bed lay the paper containing the paragraph whereby he withdrew from the presidential campaign. The inclusion of that paragraph…was so secret that it had not been disclosed to his regular speech writers, and it had not been typed as part of the body of his speech. Instead, the President’s trusted speech writer and friend Horace Busby had separately drafted and typed the paragraph, which the President intended to read at the conclusion of his address to Congress.”
Johnson walked out of the bedroom without the Busby draft. Watson noticed this but said nothing as he hoped LBJ had deliberately left it behind.
Johnson delivered his address to a friendly and receptive Congress. Watson noted that after he had delivered the body of his text the President reached into the inside pocket of his suit coat, plainly intending to pull out his withdrawal speech. LBJ fumbled from one pocket to the next, and for a moment his face displayed an expression of puzzlement and anxiety. Then he shrugged and smiled as he took in the applause.
So it appears President Johnson squandered a wonderful opportunity to bow out on a high note. When he finally got around to it in March 1968, it appeared to the American public that Ho Chi Minh, General Giap, Eugene McCarthy, and Bobby Kennedy had all ganged up to push him to the sidelines.
How many people have lived to regret leaving something important on top of the dresser when they should have tucked it away in a purse or a pocket before they left the house?
