During my time in the Marine Corps I have experienced many DoD and service specific technology transitions designed to strategically shape the organization. The introduction of new systems such as the replacement of hard paychecks to direct deposit, replacement of paper Leave and Earning Statements to the online access of financial records on MyPay, replacement of laminated ID cards affixed with Polaroid pictures to modern ID cards possessing bar codes and vital information have all been initiatives that caused friction in the beginning but shortly produced growth and efficiency in the Marine Corps. NMCI, an outsourced IT initiative, was pursued as another way to produce operational effectiveness. It however was a poorly executed program that has never stopped having start-up problems.
NMCI in theory is a great enterprise, as its ultimate goal is to incorporate IT expertise and business competencies in order to leverage innovation. But for the Marine Corps this model conflicts with culture and daily operating procedures. There is already a “cultural resistance” within the Marine Corps that top level leaders ignored. Many of the initial start-up activities were dictated to using units. The lack of involvement allowed by using units and mid-level leaders did not facilitate communication and did not help in breaking down cultural barriers. The elimination of legacy systems as part of NMCI was another activity that was dictated to using units. This created significant friction since many legacy systems that were being chopped worked very well. I personally disapproved of this action because it actually increased our workload when legacy systems we were using were eliminated. In some cases, no viable replacements were suggested. We in turn had to search for replacements or do without the legacy system altogether. There are many retired flag officers that work for EDS and other advocates of NMCI that believe that the Marine Corps is not accepting of any change; but the fact remains that there is no real communication between top level leaders and those that must actually use the system. If there were truly communication occurring between leadership and contractors in the start-up process, my fellow Company Commanders and I along with our Battalion Commander would not have wasted countless hours trying to figure out how to respond to many EDS data calls.
EDS was simply not prepared to execute the contract. EDS did not understand the “true nature” of the “portions” of IT systems they were sent in to consolidate. EDS made the mistake of using its typical business models of assigning seats, replacing legacy systems and taking control of a network. The Marine Corps functions as 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), I MEF (Camp Pendleton, CA), II MEF (Camp Lejeune, NC) and III MEF (Okinawa, Japan). Each MEF is ready to deploy and employ expeditionary ready, air-ground task forces in response to threats all over the world based on its area of responsibility. Each MEF has its own “personality” and its own set of legacy systems unique to the respective MEF. For example, each MEF still uses different legacy systems to track maintenance. It was evident to me that EDS had not truly engaged in thorough exchanges of knowledge and expertise when their technicians were trying to use IT solutions used at Camp Pendleton in Okinawa. This proved futile since the legacy system trying to be eliminated in Okinawa was not even used on the west coast. It was also clear to me that EDS did not understand Table of Organizations (T/O), command structure, and personnel manning levels. Seat assignment was initially set to reflect the unit T/O. EDS did not understand that the T/O is not a true reflection of personnel manning. Many times the T/O reflected war time manning, was not updated or reflected the lack of Marines to fill billets. We were applying a best guess on future events in order to assign seats and manage legacy systems.
Since I experienced the “frictions” of NMCI during its “start-up” I do not feel that it will ever live out the promises of the initial contract. The leaders that were pushing to implement NMCI left out too many of the important planning and research activities from the start. The momentum that may have been gained initially has slowed and almost disappeared due to rework. Basically, stopping progress to correct deficiencies created by the lack of planning. NMCI has not been successful in transferring the operating responsibility of IT functions. I am not a Communication Officer nor do I have an extensive IT background, I became very educated on IT networks because the outsourcing process was having the opposite effect it was designed to have. Further, I believe that the lack of foresight and preparation by an enterprise (EDS) that is supposed to be proficient in the centralization of data processing and networking is a strong indicator that they may not be a true industry leader after all. NMCI is like a thoroughbred that has started the Kentucky Derby already limping, at this point we keep hoping it will finish the race let alone win it, when we should cut our loses and put it out of its misery.
