“Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary bluntly defines imperial presidency as ‘a US presidency that is characterized by greater power than the Constitution allows'” (Am. Foreign Policy 118). This asserts for questionability of the acts performed by the President defined by the Constitution.
The Founding Fathers chose, instead of concentrating Constitutional authority in a single body, to disperse authority among three independent branches. This separation of powers has worked out for the best for the most part but there have been instances of what has been christened by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. as the Imperial Presidency (vii). According to Schlesinger, the Imperial Presidency results from the swelling of the presidential bureaucracy.
It all began under the direction of Franklin Roosevelt; he began a series of significant transformations within the office of the President. President Roosevelt took advantage of the authority provided to him in the Reorganization Act of 1939 when he issued Executive Order 8248, which created the Executive Office of the President. Roosevelt’s order provided for the creation of a White House staff and subsequently permitted presidents to exercise more control over the Cabinet.
Harry Truman, Roosevelt’s successor to the presidency, built upon these institutional changes to expand upon the constitutionally granted presidential powers. Problems pertaining to the coordination and implementation of foreign and military policy during the World War II (WWII) period prompted President Truman to advocate for increased presidential power in the military and foreign policy sphere.
Truman’s actions were against what the Founding Fathers had initially intended; “they had made a deliberate effort the control of the war powers” (Schlesinger 35). The Fathers had only granted the President the power to carry out foreign policy and the right to respond to unexpected attacks upon the United States. However, even after of WWII had officially ended, these powers remained. When it came time for the powers to subside Truman successfully pushed for legislation extending presidential war power authority. Thus the combination of the institutional changes within the presidential office and the emergency war powers contributed to a more centralized and efficient presidency; this centralization would lead to a nearly unrestrained presidency.
As a result of the National Security Act of 1947, pushed by President Truman to create the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, a more independent and secretive bureaucracy developed. Presidential powers progressed so much so that crucial decisions became far removed from outside scrutiny and presidential dependence on external sources was significantly reduced.
The legislation itself, allowed for an extreme institutional transformation. In 1949, amendments were made to the National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Agency was exempted from tending to normal budgetary accounting requirements. This led to a further centralized executive branch.
Consequently, with the onset of the Cold War, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency evolved to more covert activities; far from its original intention as a bureau for intelligence analysis. This persuaded the President to employ them in this role. As a result, it furthered his intentions from the public eye.
Executive privilege soon became an issue under Truman’s reign as President of the United States. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines executive privilege as “exemption from legally enforced disclosure of communications within the executive branch of government when such disclosure would adversely affect the functions and decision-making processes of the executive branch.” However, President Truman made the conscious decision not to comply with Congress’ request for information. Truman’s method of exercising executive privilege in the advent of McCarthyism once again further isolated executive decisions from congressional scrutiny and reduced the effectiveness of congressional oversight.
Executive classification orders might not have originated in specific constitutional authority; even so, they found support in Congress and the citizens of the United States because they recognized the need to protect sensitive information. The Truman Administration’s obsession with national security threats led them to extreme classification mania. This system once again worked towards further isolating the actions of the administration from the public.
Policy-making during the Korean conflict illustrated how much the national security state had altered the balance of power in the institutions that made foreign policy. The national security state required a strong presidency, able to act quickly in international crises, and the imperial presidency was ready and willing to receive that position.
Within the Constitution, however, the President is granted inherent powers according to the United States’ Constitution. The duty of the President in this capacity is to direct the militia and provide for safety of the citizens of the United States, as well as direct foreign policy and perform diplomatic acts. However, the President is not granted exclusive jurisdiction in these roles; power is divided between the President and Congress (see Table 1).
Table 1 The Constitutional Division of Foreign Policymaking Powers (Florig 198).
(President) Warmaking: Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces.
(Congress) Warmaking: Declare War. Authorize Military Spending.
(President) Foreign Policy Officials: Appoint ambassadors and other foreign policy officials.
(Congress) Foreign Policy Officials: Senate must approve appointment of ambassadors and other executive officials.
(President) International Negotiations: Negotiate with Foreign Powers. Recognize Foreign Governments.
(Congress) International Negotiations: Senate must approve treaties by 2/3 vote. Authorize funds to implement foreign policy.
The decision to enter into the Korean War was met with little congressional objection, due to the perceived emergency of the conflict. President Truman then took initiative to send troops into the conflict and did this with the minimum discussion with Congress. At no time during the conflict did Truman ask Congress for a formal declaration of war.
Truman felt that in times of crisis, that all war-powers were held by the President of the United States, so that decisive, immediate decisions could be made. The State Department asserted that there is a “traditional power of the President to use the armed forces of the United States without consulting Congress,” and that this had often been done in “the broad interests of American foreign policy” (Florig 202).
Opposition to the development of the imperial presidency in Congress was irregular and ineffective. Members feared that simply acquiescing to unilateral, executive decision-making was not setting a moral precedent and was an unhealthy method for creating and implementing policy. However, few challenged the principle of containment of communism and even fewer were willing to accept the political costs of opposing the president in a time of perceived national crisis. The effects of which would be disastrous, because of the President’s high public opinion rating during most wartime conflicts.
Obviously the President has overstepped his role in this area concerning many issues. These issues have led to mistrust in the executive branch by Congress and the public.
Florig, Dennis. “Chapter 7: The Triumph of the National Security State.” The Power of Presidential Ideologies. Praeger Publishers. 1992.
Wolfensberger, Donald R. “The Return of the Imperial Presidency.” Annual Editions: American Foreign Policy, 2003/2004. McGraw-Hill, Dushkin; 2003.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston; 1973.
