The inevitability of a Great War was as transparent in the decades leading up to 1914 as it is to the contemporary student of modern European history. The actions of the European powers and the popular ‘invasion literature’ of the time reflected the fears and forecasts of an all-but-imminent European conflagration. As the major players, sensing the encroachment of hostilities, scrambled to sure up their flanks through diplomatic and military alliances, Britain chose to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy. Although drawn by mutual interests, Britain managed to remain devoid of political entanglements despite constant lobbying, especially from Germany and the powers of the Triple Alliance. The popular invasion genre not only reflected this stance, but influenced it. Because of its position of apogee, and in defense of economic and colonial interests, Britain enjoyed the advantage of preserving her ‘splendid isolation’ during the turbulent pre-war years.
In April of 1904, France and Britain signed the Entente Cordiale,formally ending centuries of hostility between the two European powers. This conciliation, with the addition of Russia in 1907, brought together the three countries-Britain, France, and Russia-that would go to war as the Allied Powers at the commencement of the First World War.* This configuration resulted from a convoluted series of events that could have easily ended up differently.
The new political environment sparked intrigue and conjecture. Invasion fears pervaded throughout the continent, no more pervasively or proficiently than in Britain. The traditional make-up of 17th and 18th Century European hierarchy consisted of British and French rival domination in continental and imperial affairs. This relationship inherently fueled an intense rivalry and derision between the two powers, manifesting itself in accounts of faux aggressions by over-demonized intercontinental antagonists; playing off of fears generated by the changing political climate and fomented by polemical demagoguery. Compulsory education and rising literacy rates undoubtedly influenced the genre’s popularity, providing an outlet of mass consumption and an instrument for drumming up fervor and manipulating public opinion. Interestingly, many works of the time identified France as Britain’s primary antagonist. This is not altogether surprising given their raucous history.
This division was nonetheless exacerbated by British and French claims to colonial possessions in North Africa-namely Egypt. The territory held strategic importance for Britain, allowing for an expedited route to India through the newly built Suez Canal. French interests in the area centered on limiting Britain’s influence and trade. The Nile River valley also possessed lucrative agricultural potentials, for a time yielding abundant grain stores and a supply of quality cotton. Briefly occupied by Napoleon’s forces at the turn of the nineteenth-century, the area was wrested away by Britain and held well into the 1900’s. 1
On the continent, the events of 1870-1 altered the dynamics of European politics and power. The burgeoning German state, after having defeated the Dual Monarchy in 1866, burst onto the scene in 1870 with a crushing defeat of the perennial goliath-France-confusing the traditional power balance. As the “inchoate federation of Europe” scrambled to make sense of their new positions, forecasts of an impending Great War conjured new and tenuous battle lines.2
Prussia’s traditional participation in continental affairs experienced a marked shift after the establishment of a greater German state. Previously, Bismarck’s fear of Russia fueled his insistence of Prussia’s alignment with the eastern ‘Steamroller’ and Austria-Hungary (two powers traditionally hostile to each other). In 1878, however strained relations between Germany and Russia over the Treaty of Berlin caused Bismarck to sure up support with Austria-Hungary in a defensive measure and counter-balance to possible Russian aggression. With the ascension of Wilhelm II and the ousting of Bismarck, however Germany adopted an offensive air. This new aggressive policy aimed to expand commercial interests and augment the growth of German economic and political power in the Near East, conceivably at Russia’s expense.3
Russia was not the only indignant casualty of the Treaty of Berlin. Italy, still in its imperial infancy and eager for a seat at the table, left Berlin embittered over the loss of its African possession of Tunisia to France. Italian premier, Francesco Crispi, bluntly recounted the contempt shown to his country in a speech in Naples: “We were humiliated at Berlin as the last people in Europe; we returned slapped and despised.”4 Soon after, in 1882, Italy joined the forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary in opposition to France, rounding out the membership of the Triple Alliance.
In the years preceding the outbreak of the Great War, the Triple Alliance dominated political and military diplomacy. An extension of the Dual Alliance of 1879 between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the new agreement included the recently united Italy in a defensive alignment against the threats of France and Russia.† This agreement instigated the formation of the other Dual Alliance of France and Russia in 1894. Britain, sharing fears of French and Russian ambition‡, informally participated with the tripartite, however falling short of an official commitment. Britain’s refusal to formally align themselves with any power groupings stemmed from fears of being forced into a European war.5
This fear manifested itself in the pages of Le Queux’s The Great War in England in 1897. In the story, the discovery of a secret alliance forged between Britain and the members of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) represented the impetus for Russia to declare war against Britain. France, obligated by the terms of an agreement signed with Russia in 1892, consequently joins the fray on the side of Russia. This inevitably fomented fears in Britain, especially at the governmental level, about throwing in with any particular group. Britain’s interests and security benefited most from its seeming neutrality. This stance was not without precedent. Throughout British history, the imperial naval power often employed the ‘divide and conquer’ tactic; playing one group off of the other in order to weaken both sides, allowing easy subjugation of both.
Interestingly, both Le Queux and the authors of The_Great_War_of_189_ identify France and Russia as the protagonists against Britain. “Down with Russia! Down with France,” shouted a crowd in Trafalgar Square, in Le Queux’s narrative. This most likely stems from the traditional enmity between France and Britain-once bitter continental and imperial adversaries-and the engagement of hostilities with Russia in the Crimea and the issue of control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. Lord Salisbury once commented that, “France is, and must always remain, Britain’s greatest enemy.” History would eventually prove Salisbury’s words false, however they obviously reflected the popular perception of the time.
Both premiers, Lord Salisbury and Lord Rosebery, following a Gladstonian precedent, shared the inhibition that formal commitment to the alliance might pull Britain into war as the authors of The Great War of 189_ cautioned: “The Triple Alliance is not an embankment that can bar the advancing flood of war, but rather a detached fortress which must itself soon incur the danger of being surrounded and even submerged by the rushing, whirling waters of European strife.”6
Britain’s relationship with Germany factored most importantly to its independence from formal alliances. This statement in itself is paradoxical given Germany’s repeated attempts at securing Britain’s formal membership in the Triple Alliance. Although past hostilities existed between the two over the Boer War, the Kruger Telegram, the Berlin-Baghdad railway, among other things, German and British relations appeared to be amicable. In his story, Le Queux plays off this friendliness by referring to a secret treaty signed between England, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. In essence, Le Queux was implying Britain had secretly joined the Triple Alliance. This no doubt grew from the Royal connections between the two countries and the seemingly similar directions of their foreign policy. Germany-and Britain as well-believed an alliance between the two would be mutually beneficial. Britain, being the largest, most powerful naval force desired the security of Germany’s powerful land army, and visa-versa.7
Although sympathetic to German interests and unification, Britain’s leaders remained loath to commit to formal arrangements. Under William Gladstone, Germany considered any attempt in coercing British involvement futile. Gladstone believed in the ‘Concert of Europe,’ and that Britain could alleviate tension with France by abandoning interests in Egypt, fearing the Triple Alliance would only precipitate war. Source? He went as far as writing a letter published in the Italian Corriere di Napoli discouraging Italy from participating in the alliance, asking the newly united entity to cease its African ambitions, reduce its military expansion, and consider the bellicose consequences of such an alliance stating, “the ultimate design and scope of these alliances are not peaceful.”8 German politicians no doubt exhibited consternation over such remarks, fearing British dislocation from the alliance might bring about the downfall of Germany’s diplomatic§ potency.9
Successive British leaders continued a pragmatic course of action. Germany pressed Britain continuously, citing French ambitions in the Mediterranean and calling for a triple Mediterranean alliance. Lord Salisbury attempted to remain close to the Triple Alliance and to Italy without committing Britain to any military obligations, stating “I have gone as far in the directions of pure neutrality as I could safely go.” In the Mediterranean Agreement of 1887, he pledged British support to Italy in the Mediterranean in the event of French aggression, refusing official commitment. Britain’s confidence, and therefore their intransigence in diplomatic matters stemmed from their relative isolation from the tribulations of continental politics. It had the largest navy, some of Europe’s finest military leadership, and the geographical advantage of isolation.10
As Foreign Minister under the Gladstone Administration in 1893, and premier in 1894-5, Lord Rosebery felt, as did Salisbury, that Britain was more stable in its situation than Germany and therefore did not need to enter into any formal agreements. Germany understood that Britain viewed their relationship with the Triple Alliance as political and defensive, and discordant with Germany’s commercial ambitions. This caused German resentment, believing the British enjoyed all the benefits of the situation without any of its obligations.11
Germany’s discontent, however, moved them towards negotiations with France in North Africa behind the back of their British friends. As France and Russia moved closer together, Germany’s patience dwindled. Germany had sought and gained imperial territories from Britain, however, the high cost of business brought about a cessation of friendliness between the two countries.
The passage of the Second Naval law in 1900-ambitioning to build a fleet to rival the hegemony of the British on the seas-however inflamed irreparable hostilities between the two powers. The British responded in kind, and the powers of Europe inexorably raced into the abyss of war on the waves of naval expansionism. Le Queux’s story, in contrast, brings Germany in on the defense of Britain against France and Russia.12
The provident authors of the ‘Future-War’ invasion literature failed to foresee the possibility of an amelioration of animosity between Britain and France. The signing of the Entente Cordiale signaled the willingness of the two powers to settle their dispute over Egypt and other imperial possessions.
British attempts at walking their propitious diplomatic tight-rope remained remarkable. Even after entering into the Entente Cordial, Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 1916, expressed Britain’s continued ambition for neutrality:
Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together.13
Britain, for its part, tried to forestall the onset of war. Many optimists throughout Britain, including Lord Salisbury, identified a unified Europe as the only chance of avoiding war. Lord Salisbury spoke to this effect in his Mansion House Speech of 1897:
The consent of Europe, or as I prefer to call it, the inchoate federation of Europe, is a body which acts only when it is unanimous. But the difficulty of preserving unanimity is often great… Remember that the federation of Europe is the embryo of the only possible structure of Europe which can save civilization from the desolating effects of a disastrous war... The one hope we have to prevent this competition of the nations from ending in a terrible effort of mutual destruction which will be fatal to Christian civilization-the one hope we have is, that the Powers may gradually be brought together in a friendly spirit on all questions of difference which may arise, until at last, they may be welded in some international constitution or federation which will give to the world, as a result of their great strength, a long spell of unfettered and prosperous trade and continued peace.14
The “consent of Europe” almost never achieved unanimity, and the disastrous conflagration Lord Salisbury feared soon came to fruition. The decades preceding the Great War of 1914 saw the masters of Europe angle for predominance, exploit diplomatic advantages for selfish gain, and unavoidably-with seeming intent- journey down the path of war.
Although its relationship was informal, the success of the Triple Alliance depended on the role of Britain. Britain’s position and stability, on the other hand, afforded it the freedom to avoid entanglement with possibly troublesome alliances giving them the ability to protect and pursue their commercial and imperial interests. Even so, Britain ultimately plunged into the commencing conflict of 1914. The narratives of The Great War in England in 1897 and The Great War of 189_ succinctly portray the fears and positions of Europe’s political players. France and Britain eventually soothe hostilities, expanding into the Triple Entente with Russia in 1907. With Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy aligned, the stage for war was set.** As a looming expression of prophesy, the character General Sir Archibald Alison in William Le Queux’s, The Great War in England in 1897, warned:
No one can look carefully into the present state of Europe without feeling convinced that it cannot continue long in its present condition. Every country is maintaining an armed force out of all proportion to its resources and population, and the consequent strain upon its monetary system and its industrial population is ever increasing, and must sooner or later become unbearable.
End Notes:
* Throughout the war, Japan, the United States, Spain, and Italy (who began the war allied with the Central Powers) would join the fight on the side of the Allies.
† In Italy’s case, the alliance only extended support in case of attack by France.
‡ Britain wearied of Russian interests in India and Central Asia-territories in which they also harbored imperial interests.
§ Germany believed that if Britain were to restore relations with France, that might make Italy impotent in the Mediterranean, causing them to look towards Austria. Because of Austria’s enmity with Russia, it was possible that they might ally with Russia because of the fear of fighting on two fronts-effectively isolating Germany.
** Italy would eventually, however align itself against Austria in 1915 and Germany in 1917.
1 Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989) , 34.
2 Burke, Edmund (editor). Annual Register, (London: Logmans, Green, and Co., 1898) , 215.
3 Elie Kedourie, et. al. Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society. (Routledge, 1980) , 27.
4 Luigi Chiala, “Pagine di Storia Contemporanea” (Turin and Rome, 1892), I, 294-96. 17
5 Martel, Gordon. “The Limits of Commitment: Rosebery and the Definition of the Anglo-German Understanding,” The Historical Journal, 27, 2 (1984), 392.
6 Rear Admiral Colomb, et.al. The Great War of 189_: A Forecast, (London: William Heinemann, 1893), 5.
7 Martel, 390.
8 “Gladstone on Italy: Why England’s Premier is Opposed to the Triple Alliance.” New York Times, August 22, 1892.
9 Kedourie, 27-28.
10 Martel, 388.
11 Kedourie, 27.
12 Keegan, John. The First World War. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 19.
13 New York Times Current History: The European War [Supplement to May Current History]. Vol. XV
(New York: The New York Times, April-June 1915), ii.
14 Andrews, Samuel James. Christianity and Anti-Christianity in Their Final Conflict, (London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1899) p. 283. The passage was quoted from a speech give by Lord Salisbury in his Mansion House Speech, November, 9 1897.
