Jean Jacques Rousseau suggests a Social Contract; from this Social Contract the general will can be devolved. The general will is the result of people forming an association for a common goal. Their goal is “the protection of the person and the property of each constituent member” (Social Contract, I:VI: 180). By joining together, the people retain those rights that they submit to each other but also acquire the right of protection. Those rights that they protect are the core values of the general will.
This general will is that which defines what is best for the general public; it is at all times correct in its assertions. It is important because it is that which all people would hope to have for themselves, not to be hindered by others. This collective good is said to only come by structured collaboration (192).
This structured forum allows for the perfect exercise of the general will. This is because when the body politic, the people, is able to voice his or her concerns in a forum, their consensus rests upon a “common interest” (Social Contract, I:III, 193). They must do this so that they are able to distinguish the General Will from “the will of all…[concerned] with interests that are partial, being itself but the sum of individual wills” (193).
When defining the general will, Rousseau explains that it can be found when the people are properly informed and not allowed to converse with each other on the topic. This is because if they were allowed to converse then there would be the opportunity for creating personal interest groups, which would in fact support individuals with similar individual concerns.
The general will is also so broad when founded that it simply cannot be directed at specific circumstances. In this case, it is because it “must be general in its object as well as its essence; that it must both come from all and apply to all; and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular and determinate object” (Social Contract, I:IV, 196). Meaning, the general will could not justifiably be used in a specific context because it would then lose its intentionally broad nature.
This vagueness is the key to the general will’s universality; it could be used in a variety of situations. But it also offers a policy that would intend the same effects on each citizen due to the nature of the situation; a conformity in its application. Rousseau’s view of the general will can be found in the construct of the US Constitution, which is open to implementation based on the broad or strict interpretation of those analyzing it.
The purpose of Rousseau’s general will is to solve the problem stated earlier. The general will cannot ever be altered or they will become null and void. This is because their original meaning and reason for implementation was the basis for a Social Contract. Once they are modified the Social Contract is then found to be broken; the people will find themselves once again in the state of nature that they had originally been in before the Act of Association. However, the citizens are bound to the Commonwealth because they had in the beginning found mutual appeasement in the statutes of the Social Contract.
Once this Act of Association has been made, the general will is constituted and a sovereign is created. The sovereign is essentially the sum of all citizens, the body politic. Each person is a portion of the sovereign; for example, if there are 100 persons entered into an Act of Association one person is one one-hundredth of the sovereign. It is in this way that the general will is generated; the people are those which determine that which is good for the general public.
It is important to note that under the conditions of how the sovereign is composed that the sovereign cannot ask of one person what he would not ask of another. This is intrinsically valid because one person in the body politic, who makes up the sovereign, cannot ask another, an equivalent fraction of the sovereign as the former, to do something that he would not ask himself. The representation of the citizens through the sovereign also allows for another important internal soundness can be derived; “only the general will [the sovereign’s intentions] can direct the powers of the State in such a way that the purpose for which it has been instituted, which is the good of all” (Social Contract, II:I, 190). One can follow such a rule, because they are more likely to follow the rules they have made for themselves and are thus less likely to be susceptible to their own particular appetites.
John Stuart Mill’s philosophy on the issue of public discussion is so that he advocates less structure to the forum. His one principle is that individuals are completely free to do whatever they please, except those acts which harm or inhibits other’s rights to do the same. The reasoning behind this idea is that he fears “tyranny” of the magistrate and of the majority; both being addressed in this lack of formal organization.
Each of these bodies that produce apprehension in organization, the magistrate and the majority, have certain characteristics that draw a parallel between the two. It is their inherent ability for the prevailing opinion to produce a wrong conclusion or statute. Mill finds it necessary to restrict the ability of persons to create an association so that one may dispel the possibility of such a potentially damaging act to the alliance. He also states that “[t]here is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism” (On Liberty, I: 8-9)
Free discussion is what Mill would hope to combat a “corrupt or tyrannical government” (On Liberty, II: 19). He further expresses his fear of stifling a potentially true opinion in the process of producing an orderly forum, and even if we were certain that the opinion was false, we would still be inhibiting the expression of an individual, it would still be wrong (20).
By allowing free expression, one can also question the validity of an opinion. This is where some would play “devil’s advocate,” their purpose is to find fault in or to prove an opinion. There is an importance in this because one is not just accepting a belief, but challenging it to prove itself and its perceived truth. If one finds error then this success leads to modification to potentially attain a truth or the dissolution of the opinion altogether. If the opinion withstands this test for truth then one can find a “clearer perception and livelier impression” of its legitimacy; what one might call a win-win situation (20). Thus, by finding the truth from an opinion, one is finding its utility; the ultimate appeal of all ethical questions.
Examples, in which dissenting opinion is forbidden, illustrate best the nature of such absurd falsehoods. For instance, Mill expresses concern for a society that would find only truth in God-fearing people. If a person were to give an oath that they believe in God to testify in a court of law, an atheist may commit perjury by lying to the court so that their testimony would be accepted into evidence. Otherwise, their statement would be immediately disregarded because they are considered untrustworthy to tell the truth by the other citizens. This a paradoxical situation because either the atheist lies so that they are accepted and enter into the false truth that the God-fearing people believe or tell the truth and are shunned for their belief.
The most prolific difference between Rousseau and Mill is this position on the subject of order and discussion. Rousseau’s opinion on this supports the non-interaction between citizens; their overall, informed opinion will constitute a faultless general will. He feels that this general will would not need unnecessary debate because it would be free from individual, particular opinion. Mill, on the other hand, would find that by not contesting a notion a citizen is not properly utilizing their intellect. This automaton nature of acceptance will undoubtedly lead to future falsehoods until one finally realizes or is informed that the beliefs they have been following are untruthful, a fear Mill experienced personally.
Mill’s education and upbringing led to this view that one should question the motive and truth of an idea. Mill had been brought up by his father, a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, who had taught him to live by the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. However, one day he stumbled upon an internal falsehood of Bentham’s theory, which led Mill to question his existence and how he had been living it. He realized that politics was not a science; one could not elicit a process due to different situations. He found that there were also feelings and ideas incorporated into politics. This life altering event is the basis for Mill’s fervent suggestions that one should always question an assumption.
I see strength in Rousseau’s belief that there should not be any group affiliations within a society because it would establish a majority of concurrent opinions and not a true general will. However, his notion that we should not discuss also finds fault in that a deemed truth may indeed be a falsehood. A concept of Mill’s seems to combat nicely this view of Rousseau’s, deliberation is important to inquire what is the best option for the public interest. It is meant to seek out the falsehoods and then allow us to make revisions until we are able to find a truth. The first strength of Rousseau’s could also be considered a weakness; membership in an association is not completely absurd. A team of inquiring minds is more likely to find the faults in an opinion, this being an important theory of Mill. A significant strength of Rousseau’s is that he found it important to have a broad set of consistent guidelines from which to work from, preventing preferential treatment. It seems that either weakness or strength can be found in the theories of each, depending upon the situation and either can be used to combat the other in some.
Mill, John Stuart Mill. On Liberty. Penguin Classics. 1982.
Rousseau, Jean Jacques. Rousseau: ‘The Social Contract’ and Other Later Political Writings. Cambridge University Press. 1997.
