Throughout the Classical world, the earth shook beneath the feet of one of the largest, most powerful juggernauts in history: the Roman army. Their strength did not lie in numbers; in fact the Romans were often drastically outnumbered on the battlefield. On the surface, they also had a surprisingly limited range of military skills; the early Roman army was almost entirely comprised of infantry, with no cavalry or navy. How did such an unimpressive force come to control one of history’s most powerful and enduring empires? The answer lay in their ability to innovate. Unable to build a larger army, the Roman military machine focused on becoming more efficient and better trained, or by recruiting talent from their conquered enemies to complement their own strengths. By far, one of Rome’s most influential and innovative generals was Gaius Marius (157 – 86 BCE), who single-handedly introduced a number of reforms that turned the army from a volunteer militia to the most powerful professional fighting force in the Western world. His innovations were collectively known as the Marian Reforms.
During Gaius Marius’ early military career, enlistment in the Roman army was limited to landholders. Wealthy aristocrats served as officers, which was customary part of Roman civic service. Infantrymen were essentially drafted from the population of small rural farmers. This was not only an ancient custom but, at the time, was viewed as common sense. Landowners were considered to be more dedicated to the welfare of Rome and would, therefore, fight harder to protect or expand Rome’s borders. It was also quite practical in economic terms; landowners were able to provide their own arms, armor, pack animals, and other essential equipment, thus freeing Rome’s treasury from the burden of equipping its own soldiers (Parker, 47).
However, during the period from 264 BC to 109 BC, Rome engaged in a number of successive wars in Europe and Africa and sustained heavy casualties. The resulting loss of entire generations of food-producing farmers brought the Romans to the brink of catastrophic famine and also left Rome completely unprepared for the massive German invasion of 109 – 105 BC. In order to raise an army large enough to face this threat, Marius, who was by that time Consul (chief administrator) of Rome, overturned law as well as convention by recruiting legions from among Rome’s urban poor. This segment of the population numbered in the tens of thousands and had long been regarded as a drain on Roman resources. Many Romans were also concerned about social upheaval. The urban poor represented a potential for mass rioting if there was any interruption in their “bread and circuses.” Marius thus used a military innovation to solve a social problem as well as a military one.
To address the problem of military equipment, Marius first began the practice of stripping armor and weapons from the dead on battlefields. When even this proved insufficient Marius turned his considerable commercial acumen to the problem and invested heavily in arms manufacturers throughout Italy (Starr, 520). He then used his even more considerable political clout to persuade the Senate of Rome that it was in their best interests to purchase and stockpile weapons and armor to equip new recruits (thus earning himself a large fortune in the process).
However, Marius’ plans met with stiff resistance in the Senate. They feared, and rightly, that an army recruited by a single general would make that army more loyal to the general than to the Senate and People of Rome. Indeed, this would become the case, and future generals would come to use their personal armies to bully the Roman Senate into granting them extraordinary powers and privileges. The Senate’s suspicions of Marius’ intentions were confirmed when he insisted on two even more controversial issues. First, Marius proposed that his new soldiers be paid a regular wage from the treasury. Previously, soldiers were only paid out of the spoils of war, or in other words, whatever they could loot, steal, or pillage between battles. When the “fight for pay” proposal was passed, Rome boasted a full-time, professional army that could fight year-round. This alone was a significant improvement on the previous model; an army composed entirely of farmers had to return home in the autumn to harvest their crops, while the new breed of soldier could be sent on campaigns to distant locations for years at a time (Anglim, 55).
Marius’ second proposal was even more contentious: he asked that his soldiers, after a certain length of service, be granted land as a pension. This would accomplish several things: first, it would keep his discharged veterans from returning to the city of Rome. They presented an even greater potential threat with their military training, and Marius did not want such men to be left idle and disaffected. Second, the farms and small holdings that had been depopulated during the previous wars could be filled with able-bodied men, and would give them greater incentive to settle down, raise families, and produce food for Rome. Third, once all the Italian farms were full, veterans could be used to colonize and settle newly-conquered territories. Not only would they spread Roman culture and values to Rome’s furthest corners, they could also serve as reserve garrisons in case of trouble in Rome’s new territories. However, in spite of the numerous benefits to this plan, it took many years for the Senate to agree to it, and future generals who wished to continue this program faced the same uphill battle for land year after year (Erdkamp, 164).
While his new army was preparing for battle, Marius embarked on a serious overhaul of military organization and equipment. As Rome expanded its borders, it came into conflict with other large nations, rather than the smaller tribal enemies Rome was more accustomed to facing. During their smaller wars, Roman soldiers were formed into maniples of 160 men. To respond to their more powerful enemies, Marius changed the standard unit into a cohort of 480 soldiers, which were then formed into legions of 4800 men (Campbell, 9). This new formation allowed the army to maneuver more efficiently on large battlefields, and even allowed the standard infantry unit to deal with cavalry charges, something that would have been difficult with the smaller maniples. Although the maniple system had proven itself effective against Hannibal’s elephants at the Battle of Zama in 206 BC, its usefulness had waned as warfare evolved.
Marius also began to standardize every element of the military. Training methods had always been haphazard, having been the responsibility of the individual soldiers. It was expected that landed farmers would already know how to ride a horse and handle a sword and spear before joining the army, but the new soldiers culled from Rome’s slums had little or no experience with combat. Marius recruited trainers from Italy’s gladiator schools and established a formal training regimen for his raw recruits.
One of Marius’ best-remembered innovations involves the simplification of the army’s baggage train. Rather than allowing each soldier to bring their own pack animal (which none of his new soldiers could have afforded anyway), Marius ordered that all camp equipment, such as tent poles, cooking gear, picks and shovels, and other miscellanea should be divided equally among each soldier. In addition to this equipment, each infantryman was expected to march in full armor, carrying their sword, shield, two spears, spare clothing, and two weeks worth of rations. Thus, to this day, these new soldiers are remembered as “Marius’ Mules” (Parker, 51)
The Roman spear, called the pilum, was constructed of a wooden haft connected to a steel spearhead. The connecting pin was made of iron. Marius identified this as a weakness in the design because, ironically, the iron pin was too strong. Enemy soldiers frequently waited just outside of range for the Romans to throw their spears. Then, they simply picked them up off the ground and used them against the Romans. Marius had the iron pins replaced with wood, which broke apart after the spear struck its target. The thrown spear was then functionally useless to the enemy (Anglim, 56). Under Marius’ direction, the Roman shield was also redesigned. The traditional shield was in the shape of an oval, about 4 feet high, with rounded tops and bottoms. The new design removed the rounded edges and reduced the height to 3 feet, making the shield lighter and easier to maneuver in battle. Flanges were also added to the sides so that each shield could interlock with other shields on either side to create a defensive formation known as a testudo (tortoise). This solid barrier kept the front lines from breaking under a sustained charge and also provided better protection from incoming arrows and spears (Nickerson, 59).
Under Gaius Marius, the Roman army became an efficient unit. Teamwork and discipline, which had already become hallmarks of Rome’s military, were honed to even greater levels. The enduring symbol of the Roman army, the Eagle, was introduced by Marius to improve unity and cohesiveness among the legions. Each legion in the re-organized army was assigned a number, which was displayed on a placard on top of a staff which was crowned by a large golden eagle. That eagle became the standard of the Roman army and took on mythical properties. In later years, Roman soldiers would die to protect that symbol (Anglim, 56).
As Rome’s borders expanded, Rome’s army came into frequent contact with new styles of combat. Because Romans were not accustomed to archery, horsemanship, or naval operations, they began to hire mercenary archers, cavalrymen, and sailors from among their conquered enemies (Starr, 525). Always quick to seize any advantage, Rome offered its conquered enemies the chance to join the army and bring their talents. Although a standing cavalry had never been necessary (and would actually have been something of a hindrance) in the marshy, hilly regions around the city of Rome, the Roman army soon had to learn how to effectively deal with powerful cavalries in the wide open plains of Eastern Europe and the Near East. Similarly, Rome preferred to hire Greek, Sicilian, and Phoenician sailors to protect their coasts, recognizing that those regions had much greater experience in such matters. Thus, rather than trying to turn Roman infantrymen into horsemen and sailors, Rome continued to concentrate on maintaining their powerful infantry and augmenting it with outside resources.
Traditionally, Rome’s military strength was entirely dependant upon its infantry. Although there has been much speculation, there is as yet no real consensus as to why Rome became the dominant tribe on the Italian peninsula, overtaking the more culturally developed Etruscans and the more warlike Samnites. After reading “Guns, Germs, and Steel” I am beginning to believe that the Romans present an interesting example of Jared Diamond’s theory of geographic “luck of the draw.” The land around Rome was fertile enough to allow the Romans to develop agriculture, tools, specialist occupations, and all the other features that go hand-in-hand with agrarian societies. However, the same could be said of all of Italy. Rome was, in fact, probably worse off than many of her neighbors because the city was centered in a marshy lowland river valley that frequently flooded. I believe that the Romans were well-off enough to develop technology up to a certain point, but had to conquer their more fortunate neighbors to continue progressing.
Gaius Marius lived during an uncertain time in Rome’s history. During his lifetime, Rome’s Republican form of government was shaken repeatedly by internal and external warfare. For his numerous reforms, as well as his many victories on the battlefield, Marius was hailed as one of the “Founders of Rome.” However, those same innovations that saved Rome from annihilation also proved to be a catalyst in the Republic’s ultimate destruction. Later Roman generals, including Gaius Julius Caesar, took advantage of the army’s personal loyalty to their commander and declared war on their own state. Ultimately, long years of civil war would result in the end of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire. Although it is a bit of a stretch to lay all of the blame or praise for this at Marius’ door, it is clear that his innovations had far-reaching and long-lasting consequences that changed the entire Western world.
Works Cited
Anglim, Simon. Fighting Techniques of the Ancient World (3000 B.C. to 500 A.D.):
Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002.
Campbell, J. B. Greek and Roman Military Writers. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Erdkamp, Paul. A Companion to the Roman Army. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
Ltd., 2007.
Nickerson, Hoffman. Warfare in the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages. New York:
Dover Publications, 2003.
Parker, Geoffrey. The Cambridge History of Warfare. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
Starr, Chester. A History of the Ancient World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
