The United States has shown over its storied history that it possesses great pride in not only the form of government that it has chosen, Democracy, but the way in which it implements it on a day to day basis. This free flow of thoughts and ideas amongst people in powerful positions lends itself to foster unspoken entities that knowingly or unknowingly play a significant part in policy making.
Political scientists have made the observation that there exists one of these entities between three extremely powerful players in the American democratic system. An “iron triangle” is “a political relationship that brings together three key participants in a clearly delineated area of policymaking: the Federal bureaucracy, the key committees and members of Congress, and the private interest”.[1] When polices are made that shape the future path of the United States, it is assumed that every facet of the policymaking machine is involved. However, one must evaluate whether the end result in a state of affairs is truly the product of this, or rather a consequence of the “iron triangle”.
In Article II of the United States Constitution, there are specific references to the responsibilities of the Office of the President. There are few Presidents in American history who make the claim that this Article would be of such importance right from the beginning of their Presidency. It states:
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,
and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.”
This article carries with it a great burden; the burden of the good of the people of the United States. Decisions that can change the course of history are a lot for one man to process. The enormity of this process is displayed through the research that I have done to determine what factors weighed heavily on President Truman during that era, and examination to establish the presence, or non-presence, of an unspoken entity closing the doors to input.
One would hope that a President would take into consideration all participation that is rendered useful in his decision to implement a use of force, which is “…estimated to correspond to the blast that would be produced by ten thousand tons of T.N.T.“[2]
In this paper, I will evaluate President Harry S. Truman’s decision to implement the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was the outcome of him factoring in all input that he has received from players in the policymaking circle, or he relied heavily on the three prongs of the “iron triangle”: interest groups, the Federal bureaucracy, and congressional committees.
When interpreting the overall landscape that ultimately resulted in the use of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, and if the presences of barriers existed due to the “iron triangle”, one must calculate all of the information to be mentioned later and determine what influences were present. Did the President allow for public opinion to factor into his decision? Were there organized interest groups that were major players in
this process, and if so, what influence did they have? Was the balance of power amongst the different branches of the government able to perform their empirical duties?
When conducting my research for the subject, I was unable to locate any documented accounts of opinions from organizations that one could consider a “political
interest group”. While this by no means that they didn’t exist, I am of the belief that the role that they played during this time was much less significant than the role that they play today. This diminished role would account for the lack of documentation pertaining to this issue. While my search may have ended futility, I was able to find one group, unassociated with the government per say.
I am one to believe that interest groups can consist of formal and informal gathering of people. These groups can carry with them great power and influence on the making for foreign policy. One such group that exists was an informal membership of scientists that not only had knowledge of the atomic bomb, but also had strong opinions on the application of it.
“…we, the undersigned, respectfully petition: first, that you exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless the terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use the atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of the considerations presented in this petition as well as all other moral responsibilities which are involved.[3]
This strongly worded interpretation of a group of highly informed scientists with great knowledge of the atomic energy, an atomic weapon, and its deployment demonstrates not only the respect that this group of men have for the President and his office, but exhibit the deeply seeded fears of such an action. While ultimately, the President implemented the use of atomic weapons, one would think that this petition put into perspective for him the magnitude for what was about to occur. This is brought to light later in a passage from his diary.
People use many avenues to exhibit their discontent or approval of current United States foreign policy, and through these opportunities, one can decipher the differing opinions of the day. There were many differing opinions on the actions that the United States should take in regards to Japan. There were many vocal members of the media that were in strong opposition of the implementation of force on Japan, and others who were in full support of it.
The New York Times was the paradigm of the newspaper business during this era. Their staff consisted of many people well educated on the issue of foreign policy, and the United States role in the international scheme of things. In a strongly worded article written, one would think, from the opening paragraph that this was one in opposition of the current events in Japan. However, the writer, who is unnamed, expresses that previous meeting that involved President Roosevelt and other prominent leaders of countries in opposition of Japan’s actions makes the claim that Japan knows what needs to be done on their part to resolve this entire situation. The writer, however, makes an interesting observation about Japan’s tactics and reasoning. It is written,
What is prolonging the war in the Pacific is not the lack of clarity about the political terms which the Allies would impose, but rather the frantic eagerness of the Japanese
government to hold as much of its loot as possible and its unwillingness, by laying down its arms, to make Japan militarily a defenseless nation.”[4]
There was also influence from outside the political realm of the United States. In what became known as the “Potsdam Conference”, the leader of the three major allies in World War II came together to discuss the road map for post-war Europe. This meeting also included a dialogue about the plans of addressing the increasing threat of Japan. The product of this gathering, and agreement on the future of dealings with Japan resulted in “The Potsdam Declaration”. In this declaration, there were many stipulations placed upon Japan, specifically, one of the points in the declaration described the result of failure to comply with the demands stated. It was written:
We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.”[5]
Additionally, there was great clarity in what the alliance wanted to accomplish ultimately. There was to be no mistake that the member of the alliance had no intention of being an occupying entity within their own borders. As stated in the declaration:
cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom
of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.”[6]
The executive branch was the major player in the decision in the use of atomic energy as an offensive military weapon in 1945. President Truman, while making himself available to absorb the input from the people closest to him, he understood that the conclusion to the matter at hand was his. The federal bureaucracy, as demonstrated by his involvement of people in his own cabinet, was given the chance to disclose their
Foreign policy, and the role that President Truman played in it, was made apparent early in his term. History would show that President Truman would be the standard by which all following Presidents would be measured. This keen sense of the need to implement strong foreign relations with other states allowed for a true understanding of the processes needed to resolve the current issues. He was not ashamed to refer to people with expertise in areas that he felt he lacked the knowledge to make an educated move. The people who were well informed on the situation, and understood the importance, asserted themselves in briefing the President of current affairs. In a letter from Henry Stimson to Harry Truman in April of 1945, he stated,
“I mentioned [the secret matter] to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressure that you have been under. It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.”
President felt the impact that the use of weapons of mass destruction would have on the world as a whole, and was well aware of the need to analyze it from every possible aspect. His formation of the Interim Committee showed his dedication to this, and many productive discussions came from this. This committee was established to study and report on the entire problem of temporary war-time controls and later publicity, and to
survey and make recommendations on post-war research, development, and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes.[7]
The Targeting Committee served as the technical and logistic informative, and gave recommendations of potential strategic targets. There were numerous targets considered for various reasons. Some of them were military in nature, and others served as psychological targets. Names mentioned were Kyoto, Yokohama, Kokura Arsenal, Niigata, and Hiroshima. Also, from the Target Committee notes, there is an interesting alternative target mentioned. Target six was listed as the following:
“The possibility of bombing the Emperor’s palace was discussed. It was agreed that we should not recommend it but that any action for this bombing should come from authorities on military policy. It was agreed that we should obtain information from which we could determine the effectiveness of our weapon against this target.”[8]
Ultimately, the decision was made to have the first strike be on Hiroshima. Although not initially the prime target considered (Kyoto), the factors were weighed, and Hiroshima fell in line of the first use of an atomic weapon in the history of mankind. The following was the rationale used in naming Hiroshima as the initial location:
“Hiroshima– This is an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. It is a good radar target and it is such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged. There are adjacent hills which are likely to produce a focusing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage. Due to rivers it is not a good incendiary target. (Classified as an AA Target)”[9]
Under the recommendation of President Truman, Secretary Stimson assembled the Interim Committee. The purpose of the committee was “…to study and report on the entire problem of temporary war-time controls and later publicity, and to survey and make recommendations on post-war research, development, and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes.”[10] Throughout its existence, this committee served the President in many different roles
President Truman understood the magnitude of which he had to decide. He was not a man who planned military action without contemplating the outcome, and the impact on human life. In the following passage from his personal diary, President Truman displays his personal feelings on the use of such a massive weapon. When reading this passage, one can detect not only the humble feeling of possessing such a weapon, but compares the imminent event in Biblical proportions. He writes:
“We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.”[11]
He also was aware of the symbolical message that may be implied, and he wanted to reinforce that his intentions were military in manner. Governments must always take into account the image that is being portrayed, and to ensure that the true message is being sent. He went on to explain his intent.
“The weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital or the new [Kyoto or Tokyo].”[12]
While there are endless accounts of the goings on of the days, I have taken the approach of evaluating the information from the inside out. That is, start from the center, and work my way out, and appraise as far as the layers are relevant to my search.
My inability to find any hard evidence of political interest groups played a large role in this decision. Between public opinion, and the influence that public interest groups have on foreign policy, they are vital to evaluate the presence of the mentioned “iron triangle. One could ask that if they were present, and if they played the major role that they do in today’s politics, if the decision would have been the same. Would the target have been the same? Would the true intent of the bomb been portrayed in the way that it was?
Truman knew of the impact that such a move would have, and I have found no evidence through my research that every entity that existed that had influence on the President, had an outlet to voice their concerns and/or support of the matter. He made concerted efforts, that while still preserving the secure nature of the matter, he involved all parties, and implemented what could be considered an “open door policy” in reference to the issue.
On August 6th, 1945, President Truman, after all of the consideration, and all of the debate about how and what to do to resolve the ongoing dispute with China, dropped a large atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.
When looking at his speech that was given the same day, President Truman, while justifying the move, felt the need to explain the background of atomic energy and its history and evolution into the arsenal of the United Stated military. He writes:
“The battle of the laboratories held fateful risks for us as well as the battles of the air, land, and sea, and we have now won the battle of the laboratories as we have won the other battles.”[13]
Also included in this speech was pride. While still wanting to portray this as a somber day, and the extent of human loss, he explains with great gratification the development of this technology.
“But the greatest marvel is not the size of the enterprise, its secrecy, nor its cost, but the achievement of scientific brains in putting together infinitely complex pieces of knowledge held by many men in different fields of science into a workable plan. And hardly less marvelous has been the capacity of industry to design and of labor to operate, the machines and methods to do things never done before so that the brainchild of many minds came forth in physical shape and performed as it was supposed to do.”[14]
After all of my research, and all of the time that I have spent combing over documents and accounts of different committees, diaries, public writings giving the
opinions of the people of the day, I see no evidence that any “iron triangle” was present. President Truman made this decision based upon all outlets that were available to him. While some political scientists may argue that one is always present, and it has, and
always will, play a role in foreign policy making, I can not make the leap from what has been established as being present by someone else, and what seems apparent to me.
Bibliography
Adams, Gordon. The Politics of Defense Contracting; the Iron Triangle. Transaction Books, 1982. 15 Mar. 2006.
Fermis, Enrico. My Observations During the Explosion At Trinity on July 16, 1945. 1945.
Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Target Committee. Target Committee, 10 May 1945. 20 Mar. 2006
Notes of an Informal Meeting. 9 May 1945, Interim Committee. 18 Mar. 2006 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltextid=2
The Potsdam Declaration. The Potsdam Conference, 26 July 1945. 18 Mar. 2006 http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/potsdam.htm
Stimson, Henry L. Letter to President Harry S. Truman. 24 Apr. 1945. Memorandom. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
Truman, Harry S. “Press Release by the White House, August 6, 1945.” 6 Aug. 1945. 27 Mar. 2006 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-06&documentid;=59&studycollectionid;=abomb&pagenumber;=1
Truman, Harry S. President Truman’s Diary, Journal Entry July 25, 1945. 18 Mar. 2006
[1] Adams, Gordon. The Politics of Defense Contracting; the Iron Triangle. Transaction Books, 1982. 15 Mar. 2006.
[2] Fermis, Enrico. My Observations During the Explosion At Trinity on July 16, 1945. 1945.
[3] Petition to the President of the United States, July 17, 1945. Miscellaneous Historical Documents
[4]New York Times (1857-Current file) . New York, N.Y.: Jul 4, 1945. pg. 12, 1 pgs
[5]The Potsdam Declaration. The Potsdam Conference, 26 July 1945. 18 Mar. 2006
[6] Ibid
[7]Notes of an Informal Meeting. 9 May 1945, Interim Committee. 18 Mar. 2006
6 Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Target Committee. Target Committee, 10 May 1945. 20 Mar. 2006
[8] Interim Committee, op.cit
[9]Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Target Committee. Target Committee, 10 May 1945. 20 Mar. 2006
[10] Interim Committee, op.cit
[11] Truman, Harry S. President Truman’s Diary, Journal Entry July 25, 1945. 18 Mar. 2006
[12] Ibid
[13] Truman, Harry S. “Press Release by the White House, August 6, 1945.” 6 Aug. 1945. 27 Mar. 2006
