The National Security Council’s report, NCS 68, which was drafted in 1950 has widely been viewed as the model that shaped United Stated foreign policy from its inception- the beginning of the Korean War- until the end of the Cold War. But was its extreme “offensive” approach aimed at deterring the Soviet Union from future expansion and/or aggression a necessary means to an end? The expression “in the eyes of the beholder” would be the most accurate answer to the question. Depending on the angle or perspective the document is considered– there are extremely many differences of opinion in its effectiveness or necessity.
The NSC was created to be an aid to the President on matters of defense and foreign policy. The drafting of NSC 68 was spurned on by several national and international situations that seemed to snowball. The Soviet Union had already tested their own nuclear weapons. The “Long Telegram”, or “X” article, published by George Kennan could not be taken lightly. This telegram made Americans aware of the potential dangers the Soviet Union was beginning to present– “…to weaken power and influence of western powers…set major Western Powers against each other…will be negative and destructive in nature…” (p. 5). This alert by Kennan called for a policy of containment, but not in a military sense. Also the “loss” of China and the McCarthyism sweeping the nation were also preludes to the drafting of NSC 68. But once NSC 68 was complete- it literally set in “the dark” until the outbreak of war in Korea. Once President Truman knew of the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans ” Truman looked again at NSC 68 and on September3 , 1950 ordered it be taken as a statement of policy to be followed over the next four or five years and…that the implementing programs…be put into effect as rapidly as feasible” (p. 14).
As soon as the policy went into effect defense spending immediately tripled. This trend, of increase military spending, continued from this point for well over forty years. But, if the big picture is taken into consideration– this military build-up and arms race with the Soviet Union did avoid what it was aimed at doing–there was no Soviet take over of the world and there were no nuclear attacks from the Soviet Union. This is not to say that there are not any serious flaws within, or consequences of, NSC 68.
As stated, the view one has of the document in their own sense is the only true representation of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of NCS 68. The following are conclusions by different factions of the world community concerning the good, the bad, and the uncertain involved in shaping opinions of NCS 68:
The thoughts expressed by Paul Hammond tend to criticize NSC 68, but is “…sure of the wisdom and rightness of the basic policy of containment.”(p.131). Hammond does have many problems with the document beginning with its non-existence of any information on the “…delineation of service roles and missions or the uses and limits of strategic air power.”(p.131). Also, Hammond describes NSC 68 as a “scare” document which was only a draft of policy without giving any definite facts concerning budgets and forces to be used. He also sees NCS 68 as a substitute for the “…oversimplification of objectives in war.”(p.132). These flaws with NCS 68 gave the United States Government false pretenses for using/doing what it wanted to get something that was not necessarily obtainable.
William Appleman Williams presents a revisionist view of the details concerning NCS 68. The principle the revisionist generally use to mold the vision of NSC 68 is it as a tool for America to “…impose open door imperialism wherever it could reach”(p.132). Williams saw the document not as an instrument the United States Government used to correct the evils of Communism, but rather a country that has dishonored “…its noble commitment.
