“Against the common view that God plays an important role in the creation and reinforcement of moral values, Hume offered one of the first purely secular moral theories, which grounded morality in the pleasing and useful consequences that result from our actions” (Fieser 2001 1). In essence what Hume suggests and questions is: Are all matters of morality subjective or is there a more objective basis on which moral judgments can be made?
One of the concerns of Hume and other philosophers deals with who can properly judge morality? We are, of course, still in the throes of having religious leaders judge our actions today. This means, we are not merely considered virtuous or sinners, according to the Bible, but by the beliefs of our peers who may be wearing clerical garments and who have no other training than what is provided them by seminaries. Hume objects to such judgments when he wrote:
“Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude that, since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them. … Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg’d of; tho’ this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other.’ (Hume 1739 470)
It may be fair to assume that morality is not so much an ACTIVITY of Man as it is a judgment call. While it may be somewhat simplistic to compare the judgment of morality with an umpire’s call of ball or strikes in a baseball game, in the long run, it is an effort to restrict Man’s actions so that they will only serve the greatest good for himself and others.
“Like Hutcheson before him, Hume models his theory of morality on a theory of aesthetic judgement, linked with an account of the passions. The picture is roughly this. Finding something beautiful is deriving a certain sort of pleasure from it; and that pleasure is a ‘calm passion’. Similarly, approving of someone’s character, or finding it virtuous, is simply ‘feeling that it pleases’ in a certain way; and that feeling is a calm passion, though it is liable to be confused with a ‘determination of reason’. Like beauty, morality ‘is more properly felt than judged of’.” (Xrefer 2002 1)
One has to ask whether morality is merely a set of beliefs. If the answer is Yes, then Hume “Agrees that knowledge involves certainty “whereas beliefs based on their probability are by their very nature uncertain)….That is, nothing is absolutely certain…” (Meeker 2000 221) So, if we agree that there is nothing uncertain in beliefs, and if morality is nothing more (or less) than a set of beliefs, how does that affect the greater common good? Hume never totally answers this, but gives us a sort of guide to fashion our own beliefs into what morality is, or should be. And that is that we need to rely on what we see and what we know, and not on some sort of “miracles” (in which he does not believe and whose existence he doubts). In other words, morality is factual and not instinctual. Hume says: “(a) wise man proportions his belief to the evidence…” (Meeker 2000 222) In other words, morality is an action whereby one’s reality affects the reality and behavior of others. The greater good, therefore, has to be a set standard of evidentiary proof that certain behaviors affect others, while a different set of beliefs may not do so.
Hume is concerned with rational choice. According to Sally (1999) rational choice seems to employ a tool-kit of “maximization and equilibrium”. But this is employed more in the areas of economics and free trade than morality. Yet, morality also is a specter in the business world. Hume departs in some of his writing from seeing morality as merely a religious or philosophical issue. There is a real need- writing this at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution- for morality in the way one conducts his business affairs. Of course, much of this is left to the philosophers who followed him- from Locke and Adam Smith to Hayek of the more modern era. But, if there is something to be said about the greater good of society, it sure has an influence on “free trade” and the assumptions of such trade among individuals as well as nations.
Regardless of one’s profession, or status in life, Hume was more concerned with character. It is character, not actions that Hume considered the most important part of what morality is, or should be regarded as. “Rather than appealing to a divine basis for morality, Hume instead looked only to humanity’s animal capacity for ‘sympathy’ and upon the universalizing ‘moral sentiment’….It is a strategy that mitigates against Christian and rationalistic efforts, including those of Descartes and Locke, to deploy reason or revelation in the establishment of moral norms.” (Fosl 2000 1) That idea is worth exploring further. There are many religionists who see morality as a sort of divine “gift”- something that is to provide a haven for Man, and an entry into heaven. Morality, as one can read Christian doctrine, is forgiving and atoning for sins. But, those sins may well be created by Man, and not by God or some other divine spirit. It goes back to the fundamentals of Judeo/Christian beliefs in the Ten Commandments which, something Hume would have dismissed, were provided through a miracle on Mount Sinai. Hume would have us believe that no such miracle occurred, since no one ever saw or could testify to it. Rather, he would imply that the ten commandments stand as a basis for morality because each of them deals with a character trait. “Thou Shalt Not Steal” implies that honesty is the best policy, Coving a neighbor’s wife is avoidance of adultery. Hume would certainly have problems with how and whom to worship, and the fact of “graven images”. Our churches are filled with statues, stained glass windows and other replicas of Jesus, Mary, the Disciples and “angels. Are we being immoral, or exhibiting some sort of character flaw with such “images”?
Perhaps the ideal way of explaining Hume’s theories on morality and the greater good would be to compare some of his thoughts with the Hippocratic Oath: At least, do no harm. Isn’t that what the Ten Commandments, this Decalogue that is the basis for morality in our lives, are really all about? At the same time, he disagrees sharply with Hobbes and Mandeville who have theories about what Fosl (2000) calls “egoistic naturalism”. In fact, Hume tends to see “apparently altruistic acts as really expressions of self-interest” (Fosl 2000 1). Instead of self-interest, Hume uses the idea of “sympathy” to extend “human concern beyond the immediate self” (Fosl 2000 1). Basically, he reasons that human concerns provide a universal regard for others. That could very easily be considered the core of his moral arguments: “a universal regard for others”. That explains much of the Decalogue as well, no matter who created it, and how it came to be created. Hume reasons, therefore, that man cannot be moral and a loner. His belief is that morality extends beyond an individual and into his interaction with society, as well as the reverse.
If character is at the heart of a definition of morality, then this also has to include man’s thoughts, his ideas, and his imagination. In fact, Hume writes: “Nothing is more free than the imagination of man” (Hume 1739 466) However, man’s imagination may well discover the idea of sin. If Hume seems not to believe in sin as most religionists do, there are others who equate sin with God and religion. “To disbelieve in God, in divine law- and divine punishment, is also to disbelieve in sin- at least in the sense in which religious men have distinguished between saints and sinners.” (Hutchins 1956 756) What Man believes in, to bring this argument back to humanity from the “divine” is simple: we like people who do good things, and dislike people who do or are evil. Hume states: “The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society; as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance” (Hume 1739 486) Morality, it can be summarized, then, is activity that creates public good- activity which we admire. Sin or immorality is detrimental to society, an action of which we disapprove. Yet, as we discuss approval and disapproval, one also has to be aware that there may well be a confusion about morality involving nothing more than virtue, while immorality signifies vice. “Virtue tends to be identified with chastity, or at least conformity to the prevailing standards of sexual behavior. The popular notion of vice retains a little more of the traditional meaning, insofar as it implies injury to a person’s character or health” (Hutchins 1956 975). Again, it is important here to note that the word “character” and its health or injury separates virtue from vice, not the sexual connotation.
Taking Hume’s moral argument another step further, we need to explore whether morality (or lack of it) is a character trait. Are we born immoral? Or is it an acquisition? Experiences and surroundings and the impact of society actually influences man’s character, then the difference between a moral character and an immoral one may well be acquired. One could almost imagine Hume’s comment when he hears an act of immorality: “What did you expect?” he might well say, given the man’s character. Character, however, may well be a matter of choice. It is not that one chooses to be immoral, per se, but given an opportunity, a character flaw may well dictate such a choice. There are people in modern society who definitely believe that honesty is the best policy, unless and until they see an opportunity for getting away with something. Are there gradations of morality. For example, is it dishonest to take a pencil home from the office? Is it any more dishonest to steal some candy from a store? Or is the entire act- in either mode- an immoral act? Many of us would fall back on the argument that it is “reasonable” to be thoroughly honest, because it is “good” for society as a whole. Yet, Hume sees that “reason is perfectly inert and can never produce or prevent an action…Reason as a slave of the passions…” (Xrefer 2002 3) Then, how can we conclude that the greater good for society is “reasonable morality”? It all comes back to another of Hume’s subjects: the fallibility of Man. We said earlier that Hume discounts miracles, since there is no valid eyewitness accounts that they occurred, For the same reason, he tends to discount opinions about morality, because of their fallibility. It may well be meaningful to one, but not to another. Hume implies, it seems, that morality, in order to be significant for the greater good of society has to justify both ends as well as means. Morality should not merely be accepting the first of several opinions or statements rendered as fact. Morality is a seeking of the truth, as long as that truth provides for the common good and a meaningful life for society as a whole. However, and this should be a concluding summation: Hume did not see religion as the epitome of morality. In fact, he was often cited for “irreligion”. Morality and religion can sometimes be at loggerheads. It is character, and sometimes the choices that create character that provide a morality for the greater good.
Citations:
Fieser, J. “Hume Archives”
www.utm.edu:80/research/hume/hume.html
Fosl, P. David Hume” www.philosophers.co.uk/café/phil_nov2000.htm
Hume, D.: A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Section II (1939)
Hume, David: “Concerning Human Understanding” Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 35 Chicago: Encyuclopedia Britannica 1956
Hutchins, R.M. (exec. Ed.) Syntopicon: “Sin” Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 3, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1956
Meeker, K.: “Hume’s Iterative Probability Argument: A Pernicious Reductio” Berkeley CA: Journal of the History of Philosophy, April 2000, pp 221-238
Norton, D. F. David Hume: Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician Princeton, NJ. 1982).
Norton, D. F. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Sally, R.: “David Hume, Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment” New Brunswick NJ: Enlightenment, vol. 36, issue 2, Jan/Feb 1999 pp 41-44
No author listed: “David Hume” www.Xrefer.com/entry/552346
