The current democratic governments that exist in Latin America face several issues that have led to their instability, including cultural legacies, social exclusion, and institutional weakness. Yet the greatest issue leading to the destabilization of democracy and Latin America is the economic inequality that has created extreme poverty and inequality. Almost half of all Latin Americans would choose an authoritarian government if they believed that it could solve the problem of economic development (UNDP, 133). The Latin American governments face the dual objectives of promoting development and democracy at the same time, and if forced to choose between the two, many Latin Americans would choose development.
Political instability within countries is associated with poverty, inequality, and unequal access to resources, influence and power (Leftwich, 686). The challenge of the modern state is to promote economic development and economic growth, which often must be rapid in order to compete with more developed states. Rapid economic growth is possible, like Brazil in the miracle years after 1965 in which about fory-five percent of the new growth resulted within ten percent of the population, but growth can occur without development that includes the majority of the population, causing unequal distribution of income (Leftwich, 693). Development often requires radical changes in political institutions, which is challenging for a democracy because it has difficulty in allowing rapid change and taking far reaching steps to reduce structural inequality that is inherited from the past. For example, Bolivia faces stagflation, unemployment, and a drop in the standard of living since 1999, but economic reform is difficult because of the lack of development and state structure.
Another example of a democracy attempting to reform the past state structure in order to improve development is in Ecuador. The pre-democratic structure of Ecuador was controlled by a land-owning ruling class, which was separated between the highland capital and the rural coast. The middle class were also split along regional lines, as were the rural and urban classes, which were split along both regional and ethnic lines. The transition to democracy began in a country with the landowning class in power, which limited the representation of other members of society in government. The 1970’s petroleum exports boom created revenues for development but agrarian reform failed, and the economic liberalization of the 1990’s benefited the elites but not the rural and indigenous poor (North, 194). Ecuador’s case demonstrates the difficulty in creating reforms that ensure development reaches all members of society because of a structure that was inherited. This difficulty in prompting development has caused many Latin Americans to believe that they must choose between development and democracy, and if forced to choose, development is more important.
The UNDP report divides Latin Americans’ beliefs into three groups: democrats, non-democrats, and ambivalent. Those who are democrats support democracy no matter the cost to development, while non-democrats and ambivalent believe that development is more important and would support an authoritarian government if it could solve the country’s economic problems (UNDP, 133). For example, in 1990, Peru accepted the authoritarian government of President Fujimori in order to combat the hyperinflation of the 1980’s believing that this was the only answer after former President García inability to control inflation. About fifty percent of those polled in Mexico and Central America are democrats, which is more that double the number who are either ambivalent or non-democratic, while the Southern Cone countries are almost evenly split between democrats and non-democrats, and the Andes region is evenly split between the three categories (UNDP, 134). Democrats usually have had higher education, and have received more education than their parents. Non-democrats usually believe that their economic situation has worsened and that they are not as well off as previous generations. The non-democratic position parallels the lack of development that was promised under democracy. Those who benefit least from democracy prefer a government they believe could attain economic development.
With weak and underdeveloped economies, Latin American countries are often forced to depend on lending associations such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, which limits the policies decisions a Latin American leader can make for domestic issues. About fifty percent of the leaders polled by the UNDP believed that assistance from these organizations results in the loss of autonomy (160). The economic direction of a country is often determined from outside conditions, causing tension between foreign demands and national priorities. These external policies, like the Washington Consensus, do not take into consideration the specific issues within each country and only provide all or nothing solutions that are meant to achieve development in every country. The demands that these countries continue on the path to neo-liberalism despite objection from large segments of the population that have received no benefits from these policies results in distrust of leaders and a lack of credibility. The election of politicians who use bait and switch policies to win elections are faced with the reality of dependence from outside funding and are met this street protests, demonstrations, and are often forced to resign because of voters disillusionment. For example, former Bolivian president Carlos Mesa took office with the promise of social reconciliation and a return to more state intervention in the economy, but once he was faced with an economic crisis, he was forced to follow the IMF’s demand that Bolivia freeze public sector salaries, led to street protests and demonstrations that forced him to resign from office (Weinstein, 2).
Democracy’s difficulty in implementing rapid changes and guiding economic development has led to Latin Americans to believe that they must choose between democracy and economic development. The growth achieved under democracy has not improved the issue of inequality, as most of the growth benefited only a small percent of the population. Those who believe that their economic situation has not improved and that they are not better off than their parents also tend to support an authoritarian government in exchange for economic growth. At the same time, Latin American leaders are unable to meet the demand of the voters because of the dependency on external financing. Domestic economic policies are usually based around the external demands that the Latin American countries continue with neo-liberal policy even though these policies are unpopular. This leads citizens to further mistrust elected officials and democratic governments because they believe someone elected into office can not meet their demands. The lack of economic development has created a cycle of political instability as democratic institutions have been unable to solve the preexisting economic problems, which gives leaders few choices for implementing domestic policies, leading to the disillusionment of voters in their leaders and democracy in general.
Works Cited
Hagopian, Frances and Mainwaring, Scott. The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin
America. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005.
Leftwich, Adrian. “Democracy and Development: Is there Institutional
Incompatibility?”. Democratization. Vol. 12, 5. December 2005. 686-703.
Morlino, Leonard. “What’s a good democracy?”. Democratization. Vol. 11, 5.
December 2004. 10-32.
North, Liisa. “State Building, State Dismantling, and Financial Crisis in Ecuador”.
Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform. Ed. Marie Burt and Philip
Mauccri. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2004. 187-206.
UNDP Latin America and Caribbean Bureau. Democracy in Latin America: Toward a
Citizen’s Democracy (Reports and Annexes). 2004.
http:// democracia.undp.org/Informe/Default.asp?menu=15&Idioma;=2.
Van Cott, Donna. “Dispensing Justice at the Margins of Formality”. Informal
Institutions and Democracy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 2006.
249-273.
Weinstein, Michael. “Cycle of Instability in the Andes: Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru”.
Power and Interest News Report. 31 January 2005.
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report;_id=262&language;_id=1
Wiarda, Howard. Dilema of Democracy in Latin America. Oxford: Rowan and
Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2005.
