Saint Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God has proven to be both frustrating and resilient. On the surface, there is no room to refute the argument on the basis of its validity. The argument is valid. Contention arises when one considers whether or not it can ever persuade someone to believe in God. However, it can be argued that the issue of whether or not the premises have any truth value is only a symptom of a larger problem: one needs faith in order for the argument to have any motivational power at all. Norman Malcolm contends that one would need a “living faith” in order to accept the argument. An atheist may concede that the argument cannot be refuted on the basis of any contradiction, but he will never accept the truth of the argument without the embrace of faith.
Anselm’s argument can be divided into nine parts. The first premise sets the stage for the argument, claiming that things can only exist in two ways: in the mind and in reality.[1] For Anselm, things can also exist in various combinations of these two as well. An example of something that exists in the mind but not reality could be a unicorn. We have the concept of a unicorn, but the physical manifestation of this concept cannot be found in the real world. Something that exists in reality but not in the mind could be some as yet undiscovered animal species or chemical compound. Maybe a new species of monkey exists deep in the Amazon rainforest, but we do not yet know of its existence and so it cannot exist in our minds. Something can also exist in both the mind and reality. We have the concept of an elephant, and should we choose to meander over to Africa or Asia (or lamentably the zoo) we can prove that they exist in reality as well. The last combination is that something that exists neither in the mind nor in reality. A square circle is a logical contradiction, and so does not exist in the mind. The physical manifestation is just as contradictory and so it does not exist in reality either.
The second premise introduces the concept of a “greatest conceivable being.” The premise asserts that a being, greater than which cannot be conceived, possibly exists in reality.[2] It is not impossible for the greatest conceivable being to exist. The third premise is also connected to this idea of the GCB, asserting that such a being does exist in the mind.[3] The GCB can here be interpreted as God, though that conclusion need not necessarily be reached.[4]Since we have some idea of a being that is the greatest we can conceive, that being must exist at least in the mind (or understanding). At this point one might contend that humans have a limited ability to conceive of such a being. Recalling the metaphysical designation of things that can exist in reality but not in the mind, one might claim that there may exist a being that is greater than the greatest being we can conceive. One could argue that the GCB might not be the greatest being that actually exists; we simply lack the epistemic access to conceive of a being as great as one that could exist in reality. This argument can have some weight. However it does not stick as well as intended when examined in light of the further premises of Anselm’s argument.
This ushers in what can be considered the crux of Anselm’s argument; all of the later premises simply follow from this one. The premise states that whatever exists in the mind and might possibly also exist in reality might have been greater than it is.[5] What Anselm is asserting here is that existence in the mind is inferior to existence in reality. A being that exists only in the mind is inferior to one that exists in reality. Therefore, if the GCB exists only in the mind and might have possibly existed in reality, it might have been greater than it is.
When discussing a GCB it obviously is a problem if we can conceive of a being greater than it, i.e. one that exists in reality and in the mind. This is what Anselm wanted; his line of reasoning than proceeds, taking the form of a reduction ad absurdum to achieve Anselm’s desired conclusion. He assumes that the GCB exists only in the mind. If that assumption is made, it becomes obvious that the GCB is not actually the greatest being of which we could conceive. This leads to an absurdity: there is a greatest conceivable being, but it only exists in the mind, meaning that it isn’t as great as it could be. [6] Since this conclusion obviously leads to absurdity, Anselm has no problem affirming instead that it is false that the GCB exists only in the mind. The GCB exists both in the mind and in reality. [7] So, Anselm believes he has provided an a priori, valid argument for the existence of God (or more legitimately just the GCB)-and he has.
Before examining Malcolm’s Wittgenstenian critique of Anselm’s project, it is relevant to clear up a few philosophical issues regarding the structure and implications of the argument. First, a person might point out, and many have, that there is something odd about ascribing existence as a property to something. This seems to be an abstraction of what we really mean when we claim something “exists.” When I claim that my dog exists, I am not saying that, among many other traits, it also happens to have the property of existence. I am saying that my dog exists. She is sitting next to me, chewing a toy, etc. It seems weird to claim that existence is a property, comparable with her other properties of having fur, being white with one spot or having brown eyes.
Additionally, Malcolm discusses what he perceives as a potential difference between two formulations of the ontological argument provided by Anselm. In the first formulation, Malcolm asserts that Anselm is implying that existence is a perfection. Invoking Kant and Gassendi, Malcolm claims that the assertion of existence being a perfection is fallacious because it assumes existence is a “real predicate.”[8] This is connected with the earlier idea of existence as a property. To ascribe existence as predicate to something is odd. As Kant put it: “we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is.”[9] To think of existence in this way is to think of it as adding something to the object. If this is the case, than we cannot say that whatever we conceive of exists in reality in exactly the way we conceive it, because existence would add something to it.[10]
Malcolm thinks that this problem is eliminated in Anselm’s second formulation, which instead emphasizes that necessary existence is a perfection. Speaking of “necessary existence” modifies existence in a way that is consistent with our conceptions of God as an uncaused and unlimited. To speak of the GCB as necessarily existing is to rightly ascribe a property to it, in the same way as necessary omnipotence and necessary omniscience are properties of God.[11] Malcolm finds this distinction important because it preserves some of the integrity of Anselm’s argument. Perhaps one of the only substantial criticisms that can be leveled against Anselm’s argument is that it predicates existence. If this criticism is nullified, Anselm’s argument stands on much firmer ground. However, the logical integrity of the argument notwithstanding, whether or not the argument has any ability to invoke belief in God is the most important question.
The larger issue at hand when examining the ontological argument is the value it has independent of faith. Malcolm observes that, “it is hardly to be expected that a demonstrative argument should…produce in (someone) a living faith.” [12] It seems that this living faith would be required in order for the argument to have any motivational power at all. The implication is that the religious person does not come to hold any religious picture of the world or religious beliefs by virtue of the ontological argument. I cannot recall ever having met a person who was converted by Anselm. I can imagine, however, a person recognizing the validity of the argument without accepting its conclusions.
At this point it would be relevant to consider what is meant by a “living faith.” The idea, for Malcolm, is connected with Wittgenstein’s characterization of a religious form of life.[13] A religious person is a citizen in a certain community of ideas.[14] These ideas, more appropriately termed beliefs, shape the way that person lives. A religious person has a certain conception of the world and of reality. She believes that the world was created, that this Creator is a legislator as well as the giver of life. She may hold certain beliefs about sin and atonement. All of these beliefs contribute to a particular picture of the world. The religious person lives by this picture of the world, which at its root requires faith. I believe that this is what Malcolm (and Wittgenstein) meant when speaking about a religious form of life and of a “living faith.
At this point a religious person might object, arguing that the ontological argument does have considerable relevance for religious people. I will not contend this point. In fact, I believe that there is worth in the ontological argument for someone who already possesses a “living faith.” I do believe, along with Malcolm that this argument is not sufficient for religious belief. Malcolm characterizes religious belief in a Kierkegaardian light, as being derived from or as an inclination from emotions.[15] In this understanding, it is conceivable that a religious person can appreciate the ontological argument; it simply is not that force that motivates her to be religious. That motivation stems from emotions. It stems from the spiritual, and as such cannot be replicated by an appeal to reason. Asserting that the ontological argument does not have any moving power does not mean that it cannot be important or relevant to the religious person. It simply means that it is not the way by which religious faith is accessed.
Another remark that may be made in defense of the ontological argument is that is a means by which a religious person can defend her belief from attacks based on religious beliefs being contradictory or unreasonable. At the very least the ontological argument provides the religious person with a way to defend her beliefs from being classified as being totally without reason. Many atheists attack religious belief based on the assumption that they are not in conformity with reason. This attack is not one that can be refuted solely on the basis of the ontological argument, especially considering it is not the motivation for religious belief in the first place. However, it does provide some material by which a religious person can justify her beliefs to someone who does not accept their framework. I personally would not condone this defense of religious belief, as it appeals to theoretical enterprise that I, along with Malcolm and D.Z. Phillips, reject. But I can imagine that someone who rejects the Wittgenstenian notion that theorizing does not settle confusions might be more sympathetic to using the ontological argument in this manner.
Indeed, the atheist may be able to take away more from the ontological argument than Malcolm lets on. Of course, it is extraordinarily unlikely, probably even impossible for the atheist to experience any religious awakening as a result of Anselm’s reasoning. However, the argument does provide a sort of window into the religious picture of the world. The religious person sees the world as a gift from God. God has a very real role in creating the world, meaning that She obviously does not exist solely in the mind or the understanding for the religious person. The ontological argument provides at least some lens through which an atheist can understand how a religious person sees the world. The argument may not be the way by which religious belief is accessed, but it could be a way by which an atheist could access what it might mean to have religious beliefs.
Malcolm maintains that, “it would be unreasonable to require that the recognition of Anselm’s demonstration as valid must produce a conversion.”[16] I believe this to be true. The religious person does not arrive at belief in God through reason or any argument, no matter how eloquent or perfect. The religious person’s belief in God is an emotive one. Though Anselm’s argument is valid-provided one accepts the second variation of “necessary existence as a perfection” instead of “existence as a perfection”-it leaves something to be desired.
On a final note, I believe that what Malcolm sees as valuable in the ontological argument is its ability to clear up some conceptual confusion about what it means to believe in God. He says as much in the conclusion of his essay, but I believe a little more can be said on the subject. D.Z. Phillips, another prominent Wittgenstein scholar has discussed what he characterizes as an erroneous conception of religious belief as a theoretical enterprise.[17] The attempt to establish a rational foundation is an approach that Wittgenstein, Phillips and Malcolm all reject. This idea is woven in with the conception that the project of philosophy is one of conceptual clarification, rather than theorizing or explanation. In this understanding of philosophy, the philosopher’s job is to clear up grammatical and conceptual misunderstandings; to clear the air.
The ontological argument can then be respected for its ability to clear up some confusion about the grammar of God. As Phillips and Malcolm both elaborate, the philosopher of religion “unties knots.”[18] However this claim is a contentious one; many philosophers reject this understanding of philosophy entirely. I will not offer a judgment on whether this position offers a correct understanding of the task of philosophy. I do find the position relevant, however, when examining Malcolm’s approach to the ontological argument. Whether or not one accepts this conception of philosophy itself, I do think it is without question that the ontological argument lacks any emotive inspiration. Thus it could never move someone to belief in God by itself. She would need a very different sort of inspiration for a religious awakening.
[1] Anselm 611.
[2] Anselm 612.
[3] Anselm 612.
[4] The term “God” can and often is woven together with certain traits (perfect goodness, benevolence, etc.). It can be argued that the greatest conceivable being would necessarily be perfectly good or benevolent. However, it can also be argued the other way; the greatest conceivable being could be argued to be one with not emotive properties. Either way, I do not see it as incontestably apparent that the GCB is synonymous with God.
[5] Anselm 612.
[6] Anselm 612-613.
[7] Anselm 612.
[8] Malcolm 616.
[9] Kant (In Malcolm 615)
[10] Kant (In Malcolm 616)
[11] Malcolm 619.
[12] Malcolm 622.
[13] Malcolm 622.
[14] This statement is derived from Wittgenstein.
[15] Malcolm 622.
[16] Malcolm 622.
[17] Phillips 118.
[18] Phillips 118.
Works Cited:
Malcolm, Norman. “Anselm’s Ontological Arguments.” Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Ed.
Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman. Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
1998. Chapter 53.
Phillips, D.Z. Beliefs, Change and Forms of Life. Atlantic Highlands. Humanities Press
International, Inc. 1986.
Saint Anselm. “The Ontological Argument.” Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Ed.
Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman. Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
