“The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness” by Simon Wiesenthal is the true story of the author, a Jewish man, who was imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp. During his time in the concentration camp, he was asked by a dying Nazi soldier for forgiveness for his crimes against the Jewish community. This request raises several moral questions. Is it alright to forgive someone who has done no harm to you? Can a person forgive someone on behalf of others? Can anyone really forgive anyone else, or is forgiveness in the hands of a higher power? These moral questions apply not only to this particular situation, but to almost every decision we make in our everyday lives.
A moral question that this story raises is whether a person can forgive someone on behalf of others, and can a person forgive someone who has done no harm to them. Sven Alkalai asks in his essay, “Who is entitled to speak on behalf of the victims?” (103). He is asking what deems a person worthy to dole out forgiveness on behalf of other people, and is this really appropriate. Deborah E. Lipstadt says in her response essay, “The question to be asked is not should the prisoner have forgiven the SS man but could the prisoner have forgiven him? … The SS man had done nothing against him specifically. The Jews who had been burned to death by this soldier had not authorized anyone to forgive on their behalf” (195). This statement is clearly saying that no one has the right to forgive anyone on behalf of another, because they were not affected themselves. I agree with this. Forgiveness shouldn’t be left up to a third party who has little or no attachment to the actions and people now seeking forgiveness. In the case of this story, the soldier asks Simon for forgiveness because he is a Jew, and in his mind all Jews are equal. But all Jews are not the same. Simon had not been burned alive, shot dead, or been involved with any other of the heinous acts committed against the Jews in concentration camps. How could his forgiveness, had he granted it, put the soldier at rest about the hundreds of Jews he had been a party to the murder of? Is this real forgiveness, or just a comforting feeling, knowing that someone had said to you, “I forgive you”. Tec Nechama says in his essay, “I have no right to forgive crimes committed against others. Only those who were harmed, in this case the murdered Jews, have a right to forgive, not I” (257). Forgiveness on behalf of others is an interesting moral dilemma.
Yet another question raised by Simon Wiesenthal’s story is if forgiveness is in the hands of mere humans or is it up to the discretion of a higher power. Robert McAfee Brown says in a response essay to Wiesenthal’s story, “I think I would have urged the young man to address his plea directly to God, and throw himself on the possibility of Divine Mercy,” (123). Brown is suggesting that people should leave the decision of forgiveness up to God. I agree and disagree with this opinion. I feel that this is shifting responsibility to a higher power in order for the person who has be asked to forgive to suffer no consequences. Also, many people do not believe in God or a higher power, so there is no one to shift the responsibility to. However, I can understand this belief because many believe that humans are not really capable of granting true forgiveness, and that forgiveness is such an extreme thing that it must be dealt with by a higher power. Robert Cole says in his essay that he would “pray to God for the forgiveness of that Nazi, who claimed to be repentant” (128). He is saying that he would simply pray to God to ask for the Nazi’s forgiveness, but that ultimately the decision is left up to God. The question of whether or not forgiveness is in the hands of a higher power is an interesting one.
I think that Simon had no right to forgive the soldier and should not have done so. The soldier had committed no crime against Simon personally, and for Simon to forgive him would have been an empty phrase [with no meaning]. The forgiveness of the soldier needed to be between himself and the Jews he murdered, and perhaps between himself and God or another higher power. Simon was absolutely correct not to forgive the soldier, and if I was in such a position, I would not have forgiven him either.
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Alkalai, Sven. [Essay]. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. Simon Wiesenthal. New York: Schocken Books, 1998: 101-105.
Brown, Robert McAfee. [Essay]. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. Simon Wiesenthal. New York: Schocken Books, 1998: 121-124.
Coles, Robert. [Essay]. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. Simon Wiesenthal. New York: Schocken Books, 1998: 126-129.
Lipstadt, Deborah E. [Essay]. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. Simon Wiesenthal. New York: Schocken Books, 1998: 193-196.
Tec, Nechama. [Essay]. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. Simon Wiesenthal. New York: Schocken Books, 1998: 255-262.
Wiesenthal, Simon. The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. New York: Schocken Books, 1998.
